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Key findings
• Agriculture is dependent upon nutrients 
found in the soil; humans have been 
supplementing soil nutrients with 
external sources such as animal manure 
and leguminous plants since the dawn of 
agriculture.
• Today the global fertiliser industry is 
controlled by a handful of extremely 
powerful corporations. In 2012 the global 
sales of NPK fertilisers alone were over 
US$200 billion. In 2010 BHP Billiton, 
the world’s largest mining company, 
attempted a US$40 billion hostile takeover 
of Canada’s Potash Corp, one of the world’s 
largest fertiliser companies.
• Fertiliser use is currently low in Sub-
Saharan Africa—1.6% of the global 
total. However, parts of the continent 
are said to be teetering on the edge of 
a natural gas boom which is expected 
to stimulate massive investments in 
fertiliser production across the continent. 
Accordingly the fertiliser industry has 
planned investments totalling upwards of 
US$8 billion in new fertiliser plants.
• Fertiliser is central to the new Green 
Revolution push in Africa. The Abuja 
Declaration on Fertilisers for an African 
Green Revolution (2006) called for an 
increase in average fertiliser use on the 
continent, from 8kg per ha to 50kg per ha, 
by 2015.
• Similarly, the Alliance for a Green 
Revolution in Africa (AGRA) has placed 
increased fertiliser use at the centre of 
its activities. By the end of 2013, 55% of 
AGRA’s Soil Health Programme grants had 
been spent on increasing fertiliser supply 
in 12 African countries. AGRA’s largest 
single grant to date was its US$25 million 
contribution towards the establishment 
of the African Fertiliser Agribusiness 
Partnership (AFAP).
• The private sector is most conspicuously 
represented within the new Green 
Revolution push by the Norwegian 
Fertiliser giant, Yara International ASA. 
Yara is one of the key private sector 
players behind the New Alliance for Food 
Security and Nutrition, initiated by the 
Group of Eight (G8), and the Grow Africa 
platform, a joint programme of the World 
Economic Forum (WEF), the African Union 
Commission (AUC) and the New Economic 
Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD).
• The re-emergence of fertiliser subsidies 
in many African countries has further 
complicated the issue. In 2011 ten African 
countries spent over US$1 billion on 
agricultural input subsidies. ‘Smart’ (or 
targeted) subsidies have been encouraged 
by the Abuja Declaration and other 
organisations such as the World Bank. 
However, documented experiences have 
described problems such as elite capture 
(i.e. the appropriation of resources 
intended to benefit the larger population 
by a few individuals or organisations of 
superior status); political interference; 
and the divergence of scarce resources 
away from important areas of agricultural 
research, such as crop and soil science.
About this paper
In the past few years the African Centre for 
Biosafety (ACB) has embarked on a research 
programme to track, monitor and critique 
the plans and activities of the Alliance for a 
Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) and, more 
generally, initiatives aimed at advancing a 
Green Revolution in Africa. These include 
the links to private agribusiness expansion 
and the implication of these for small-scale 
farmers on the continent. ACB has identified 
seed and soil fertility as strategic entry points 
into broader debates about agricultural 
development in Africa, and the role of private 
profit in improving conditions of producers 
and consumers. This is based on the current 
importance being placed on ‘modern’ input 
supply to kickstart the Green Revolution. The 
wider use of improved seed and inorganic or 
synthetic fertilisers is considered essential 
in the Green Revolution modernisation of 
African agriculture.
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In 2012 ACB produced an overview and initial 
critique of AGRA’s core programmes on seed 
and soil health1, followed in 2013 by a detailed 
response to AGRA’s Africa Agricultural Status 
Report 20132. As this project progressed ACB 
realised the need also to track implementation, 
otherwise the enquiry would remain at the 
level of broad, discursive critique only. It is 
important to discern how farmers and their 
organisations are engaging with Green 
Revolution projects and programmes.
Accordingly ACB has launched a field research 
programme in partnership with farmers, 
farmer organisations and other Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs) on the continent, both 
to track the actual implementation of AGRA 
and other Green Revolution projects, and to 
consider the impacts on small-scale farmers as 
a differentiated category in which not everyone 
is equally affected. ACB will use this research 
to inform strategic and practical approaches 
together with its partners at national, regional 
and continental levels in its work towards food 
sovereignty in Africa.
This paper seeks to cover some of the trends 
in fertiliser use in Africa, provide an overview 
of the policy environment and explore 
the connections between some of the key 
players involved. This publication will later be 
accompanied by a short study on the African 
Fertiliser and Agribusiness Partnership (AFAP), 
which was launched at the African Green 
Revolution Summit of 2012.
Executive summary
Soil performs numerous functions vital to life 
on Earth, including the filtration and regulation 
of water cycles, the recycling of decaying 
plant and animal matter and as a regulator 
of biological and chemical cycles (including 
those of carbon, phosphorus and nitrogen). It 
also provides the medium upon which food, 
medicinal and fibre crops are grown for human 
use, together with a wide range of important 
building materials, such as clays and sand.3 
The diversity and abundance of life that exists 
within the soil is greater than in any other 
ecosystem.4
Healthy plant growth requires the presence 
of 16 essential elements. Of these elements, 
hydrogen, carbon and oxygen are obtained 
mostly from the air and water; the remaining 
elements come from the soil. Some of these 
nutrients, including nitrogen (N), phosphorus 
(P), potassium (K), calcium (Ca), magnesium 
(Mg) and sulphur (S), are required in large 
quantities and are known as macronutrients. 
The link between soil fertility and agricultural 
production has been recognised since the 
beginning of recorded history. In Europe 
archaeological evidence has emerged of 
farmers using manure and water management 
techniques up to 8,000 years ago. In The 
Odyssey Homer refers to the application of 
animal manure to vineyards.5
The emergence of a coal-based economy 
in the mid-19th century, for the first time, 
provided large sources of external nutrients 
for agriculture and led us down the present 
trajectory of high external input agriculture. 
Many of the chemicals and processes used 
to create fertilisers were first used for the 
manufacture of explosives. The discovery of 
the Haber-Bosch process in 1908 (whereby 
atmospheric Nitrogen could be converted 
into Nitrogen fertilisers, using natural gas) 
dramatically increased access to cheap 
fertiliser. After the Second World War, much of 
the excess munitions stockpiles left-over were 
re-channeled into fertiliser production. By the 
end of the 20th century global fertiliser use 
had increased tenfold.
According to the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations 
(UN), the total demand for fertiliser nutrients 
is expected to grow by 1.9% per annum from 
2012 until 2016, to reach a total consumption 
of 194.1 million tons.6 To meet this, the 
International Fertiliser Association (IFA) expects 
the implementation of 58 new urea plants 
between 2010 and 2015, while rising natural 
gas prices in the Middle East (which currently 
accounts for 32% of global urea exports) has 
spurred interest in exploiting natural gas 
sources in Africa.
In the global fertiliser industry, scale is 
everything. A modern urea plant costs 
approximately US$1 billion to construct.7 In 
2012 global sales of NPK fertilisers (complex 
fertilisers providing nitrogen, phosphorus and 
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potassium) were worth over US$200 billion. 
The same year, the two biggest fertiliser 
companies by revenue (Agrium and Yara) made 
US$16.5 billion and US$15 billion respectively. 
Profit margins have also been rising—from 
2008 to 2013 the average profits of the top ten 
global fertiliser companies increased by 173%. 
At the height of the fertiliser price boom of 
2008-2009, members of Canpotex, Canada’s 
legal export cartel for potash fertilisers 
(containing potassium), were recording profit 
margins in the region of 480%.
With fertiliser production limited to natural 
gas deposits (in the case of nitrogen-based 
fertilisers) or geographically sparse mineral 
deposits of potash and phosphate rock, the last 
five years have seen a flurry of activity, with 
some of the world’s largest mining companies 
entering the fray. In August 2010 BHP Billiton, 
the world’s largest mining company, launched 
a massive US$40 billion hostile takeover 
bid for Canadian mining house The Potash 
Corporation of Saskatchewan (commonnly 
known as Potash Corp). The importance of 
Potash Corp and its vast potash reserves was 
not lost on the Canadian government, who 
rejected the bid, or the Chinese government, 
who gave tacit backing to state-owned 
chemical company Sinochem to try to disrupt 
the bid by BHP. Bill Gates, through his private 
investment vehicle, is the largest shareholder 
in the Canadian rail network, which has just 
signed a ten year transport contract with the 
Canadian potash cartel. Gates has also invested 
in Egyptian fertiliser company OCI N.V.
Though Africa accounts for less than 1.6% of 
global fertiliser consumption, parts of the 
continent are said to be poised on the brink 
of a natural gas boom expected to stimulate 
massive investments in fertiliser production 
across the continent. A brief review of the 
literature reveals planned investments 
upwards of US$8 billion in this regard. Parallel 
to this is the recently established push for 
an African Green revolution, which seeks to 
replicate the Green Revolution experiences 
of Asia and Latin America on the African 
continent. While slightly more nuanced than 
earlier attempts, the current push continues 
to drive small-scale farmers in Africa to adopt 
expensive inputs and produce surpluses for 
market. Fertiliser plays a fundamental role in 
this model. Several large fertiliser companies, 
including Yara, Notre Chemical Industries of 
Nigeria, South Africa’s Omnia, and the Office 
Chérifien des Phosphates in Morocco, also 
known as OCP Group SA (OCP), already have 
significant operations on the continent; they 
stand to benefit handsomely from this fertiliser 
impetus.
The push for increased fertiliser consumption 
across the continent is most clearly articulated 
in the Abuja Declaration on Fertilisers, 
announced at the African fertiliser summit of 
2006. It calls for Africa to increase its overall 
fertiliser use to 50kg per ha by 2015, and 
proposes a number of actions to achieve this. 
Although accurate and up-to-date information 
on progress towards this goal is difficult to 
find, it is fairly clear that this target is a long 
way from being met. The African Fertiliser 
Funding Mechanism (AFFM), proposed under 
article 11 of the Declaration, is still not fully 
operational. Despite progress being slow, many 
of the policy initiatives have acquired lives of 
their own within African Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs).
In the intervening period the Alliance for a 
Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) has been, 
arguably, the most prominent platform 
advocating the Green Revolution in Africa, and 
its language and logic is echoed in the more 
recently created Grow Africa, and the G8’s New 
Alliance on Food Security and Nutrition. By 
the end of 2013 AGRA’s soil health programme 
had devoted US$37.5 million—55% of its total 
investments—to increasing fertiliser supplies 
http://www.oneacrefund.org/blogs/tag/fertilizer/56
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in Africa. AGRA’s largest single commitment 
to date has been a US$25 million contribution 
towards the establishment of the African 
Fertiliser Agribusiness Partnership (AFAP), a 
public-private partnership. AFAP provides credit 
guarantees and grant funding to fertiliser 
companies wishing to establish operations in 
the three countries of AFAP’s initial focus—
Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania.
The International Fertiliser Development Centre 
(IFDC) has had a presence on the continent 
since 1987 and is another significant player in 
the fertiliser push in Africa. The IFDC’s donors 
include all the major fertiliser industry bodies, 
and from 2009 to 2011 it also received over 
US$16.6 million from AGRA. Its projects across 
the continent range from strengthening agro-
dealer and input networks to the privatisation 
of Rwanda’s fertiliser value chain. It works 
closely with AGRA and the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) 
on a number of projects. In 2013 it trained 
nearly 690,000 Agribusiness stakeholders 
in Africa. USAID has been very active in West 
Africa, working on the harmonisation of 
fertiliser policy and regulations, and agro-
dealer and farmer training. It has also funded a 
number of studies, conducted by the IFDC, into 
increasing fertiliser use in seven countries in 
eastern and southern Africa.
Grow Africa and the New Alliance for Food 
and Nutrition have also prioritised the 
increased use of fertilisers. Five of the country 
co-operation frameworks within the New 
Alliance call for the creation of fertiliser policy, 
as well as more private sector participation 
in the fertiliser arena. The fertiliser industry is 
also well represented within the Grow Africa 
initiative, in which the Norwegian fertiliser 
giant, Yara, is by far the most prominent 
actor. Yara is the world’s largest producer of 
ammonia, nitrates and complex NPK fertiliser 
and has had a presence on the African 
continent since 1929. The company celebrated 
its centenary in 2005 by launching the Yara 
Foundation and the Yara Prize for a Green 
Revolution. (Controversially, the first prize 
winner was Ethiopian president Meles Zenawi). 
Yara has been one of the key players behind 
the World Economic Forum’s foray into African 
agriculture, through Grow Africa and the 
agricultural corridors approach.
The issue of fertiliser use in Africa has been 
further complicated in recent years through 
the revival, after a long period of being out 
of favour, of fertiliser subsidy programmes, 
described arguably as ‘the region’s most 
important agricultural policy development 
in recent years’.8 In 2011 ten African countries 
spent approximately US$1.05 billion on Input 
Subsidy Programmes (ISPs), amounting 
to 28.6% of their public expenditures on 
agriculture. Approximately 40% of the fertiliser 
consumed in Sub-Saharan Africa is subsidised 
to varying degrees.
Inspired by the sudden resurgence in ISPs, 
a number of detailed academic studies 
on fertiliser subsidies have recently been 
undertaken and have found mixed results at 
best. In Zambia, Malawi and Tanzania evidence 
has emerged of elite capture, even though the 
subsidies were supposed to be targeted at the 
poorest. Another commonly reported problem 
is  the ‘leakage’ of fertiliser meant for the 
subsidy programme into commercial markets 
or even other countries. Further, fertiliser 
subsidies divert scarce resources away from 
important research into crop and soil science. 
In Zambia less than 15% of annual agricultural 
expenditure goes into such research, compared 
with 40–70% of the agricultural budget which 
is spent on subsidy programmes. Malawi, 
which went from a period of food deficit to 
food surpluses following the implementation 
of input subsidies, is often held up as a 
shining example of the effectiveness of ‘smart 
subsidies ‘. However, issues with agricultural 
data, the problem of elite capture and the 
huge costs of these programmes have left 
many experts questioning the long-term 
sustainability of ISPs.
Introduction
Recent initiatives to modernise African 
agriculture have placed a strong focus on 
the need for increasing adoption of a Green 
Revolution package by Africa’s smallholder 
farmers, including the use of fertilisers.
This is not a paper about soil health 
methodologies as an alternative to fertiliser, or 
the well-known environmental impacts caused 
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by chemical fertilisers, both of which have been 
covered in much detail elsewhere. Some basic 
information is given regarding soil processes 
and formulation, and the role of different 
chemical elements in plant nutrition, but only 
in an attempt to convey the complexity of the 
soil fertility issue and to contrast this with 
the very prescriptive offerings of the fertiliser 
industry, which tends to focus production on 
the macro nutrients—Nitrogen (N), Phosphorus 
(P) and Potassium (K).
The Green Revolution push in Africa cannot 
be seen as isolated from wider global events, 
such as climate change and the new scramble 
for resources underway in the extractive 
industries. Whether these are linked explicitly 
to Africa or not, they will inevitably have 
an impact, politically, economically and 
environmentally.
This push is being conducted on multiple fronts 
by a multitude of actors, many of whom are in 
cahoots. The recent implementation of fertiliser 
subsidy programmes in a number of African 
countries has further complicated the issue, 
as the whims and goals of the international 
donor community and national governments 
are often not in unison. Though the Abuja 
Declaration on Fertilisers (a process that has 
the tacit approval of the international donor 
community) has called for the implementation 
of smart subsidies, evidence on the ground has 
found that where these have been attempted 
numerous political economy issues have come 
to the fore.
The paper opens with a brief overview of 
soil matters, the development of soil health 
methodologies (including the implementation 
of chemical fertilisers), and an overview of the 
current global fertiliser industry and recent 
trends. It gives a brief summary of the situation 
in Africa before profiling some of the key policy 
and initiatives and organisations behind the 
fertiliser push in Africa, before concluding with 
an overview of fertiliser subsidies in Africa.
Soil9
“Without soil, the plant as we know it  
would not function.”10
The word soil conjures up a plethora of 
meanings and images, some technical, some 
highly emotive. Those who have committed to 
its study define the soil as ‘any loose material 
at the surface of the Earth that is capable of 
supporting life’.
Soil forms as the result of interactions between 
the atmosphere, the biosphere and the geo-
sphere. It performs many functions that are 
vital to life on Earth, including the filtration 
and regulation of water cycles, the recycling 
of decaying plant and animal matter and as 
a regulator of biological and chemical cycles 
(including those of carbon, phosphorus and 
nitrogen). Finally, the soil provides the medium 
upon which food, medicinal and fibre crops are 
grown for human use, and also a wide range 
of important building materials, such as clays 
and sand. The diversity and abundance of life 
that exists within the soil is greater than in any 
other ecosystem on the planet.11
Soils comprise varying proportions of minerals, 
water, air and organic matter. Broadly speaking, 
a sample of soil can contain up to 95% 
minerals, between 15%–35% water and air, 
and up to 5% organic matter. (In arid regions 
the amount of organic matter and water will 
be much less.) There are three main classes 
of soil particle, based on size: clay (<0.002mm 
in diameter), silt (0.02–0.64mm) and sand 
(0.063–2.0 mm). Soil properties also vary with 
depth, forming a series of horizontal layers 
called ‘horizons’, with higher levels of organic 
matter generally found towards the surface. 
Just below the surface is the topsoil, which 
is considered the engine room of soil. If this 
topsoil is removed, without interventions 
it could take hundreds of years to be fully 
regenerated.
There is an inordinate variety of soil forming 
factors and processes that influence the 
properties of soil and thus its suitability for 
certain human actions, such as agriculture. 
The most important factors in soil forming 
processes are the parent material from which 
the soil is derived, the topography of the 
soil (for example, soils found on slopes are 
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more freely draining of water than those at 
the bottom of hills), climatic factors such as 
precipitation and average temperatures and 
the presence of living organisms. All of these 
factors are influenced over periods of time that 
can vary from hundreds to thousands of years.
Among the most common of the soil 
forming processes are physical and chemical 
weathering, leaching, salinisation or the 
presence of burrowing mammals or beetles 
and earthworms (in temperate zones) or ants 
and termites (in the tropics).
Soils of Africa
Large parts of Africa are unsuitable for the 
cultivation of crops. According to the Soil Atlas 
of Africa, a joint collaboration between the 
European Union, the United Nation’s Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (UN FAO) and the 
African Union (AU), just 8% of the continent’s 
land surface is covered by soil that is ‘relatively 
free of natural constraints for agriculture’.12 
Soil degradation is said to affect about 65% of 
African farmland. On average, 600 kg N/ha has 
been lost from African soils during the last 30 
years, from around 200 million ha of cultivated 
land.
In tropical Africa much of the land surfaces 
are 60–100 million years old, resulting in soils 
that have been heavily weathered and suffered 
nutrient loss. Soils under tropical rainforests 
are not naturally fertile, but depend instead on 
the high and constant supply of organic matter 
from natural vegetation. The productivity 
of the soil is thus quickly and dramatically 
diminished when this cycle is broken, such as 
through commercial logging or clearance for 
plantations, both of which have been on the 
rise across the continent. In the year 2000 the 
FAO reported that deforestation was occurring 
at double the average rate observed in the rest 
of the world.13
Water is critical to soil health and much of the 
continent receives either too little or too much. 
In areas where annual precipitation is less than 
250mm, vegetation is very low or non-existent, 
severely limiting soil-forming processes. 
Conversely, some areas receive too much 
precipitation at specific times, i.e. when rainfall 
exceeds the rate of evaporation. This waterlogs 
the soil and drives important processes such as 
the leaching of nutrients from the topsoil into 
lower soil horizons, out of reach of plant root 
systems.
Soil/plant chemistry 
Healthy plant growth requires the presence 
of 16 essential elements of which hydrogen, 
carbon and oxygen are mostly obtained from 
the air and water. The remaining elements 
come from the soil. Some of these nutrients, 
including nitrogen (N), phosphorus (P), 
potassium (K), calcium (Ca), magnesium (Mg) 
and sulphur (S), are required in large quantities 
by the plant, and are called macronutrients. 
Plants need large quantities of N, P and K, 
commonly known as the primary nutrients, so 
these are usually depleted from the soil first. 
Ca, Mg and S are known as secondary nutrients. 
The micronutrients are boron (B), copper 
(Cu), Iron (Fe), chloride (Cl), manganese (Mn), 
molybdenum (Mo) and zinc (Zn).14
Nitrogen (N) combines with carbon (C), 
hydrogen (H) and oxygen (O) to form amino 
acids, the building blocks of proteins and 
enzymes. N is required for the production of 
plant dry matter, and proteins in grain crops. 
Insufficient N leads to plant stunting and, 
because N-deficient crops reach maturity 
prematurely, reduced yield. The older leaves 
of plants deficient in N will turn pale green to 
yellow, as N is translocated to younger tissue. 
N is taken up by plants in the form of nitrate 
(NO3–) and ammonium ions (NH34+).15
Phosphorus (P) is a component of 
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and plays a major 
role in energy storage and cell membrane 
maintenance. Large amounts of P are required 
where plant growth takes place, such as 
in shoot and root tips, and it is important 
for flower development and seed and fruit 
production. Insufficient P can leave the plant 
susceptible to plant disease. As with N, P is 
translocated within plants to younger tissue. 
A dark green to blue green coloration of 
older leaves is a sign of P deficiency. In cases 
of severe P deficiency leaves and stems will 
appear purple. P deficiency also hinders root 
development and tillering (the formation of 
a plant shoot that springs from the root or 
bottom of the original stalk), plant growth, 
flowering and fruiting and delays the process 
of crop maturation. P is taken up from the soil 
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solution in the form of H2PO4 – and HPO42– 
ions.16
Potassium (K) is contained in the cell sap 
and catalyses the activity of many enzymes 
involved in plant metabolism. It also affects 
protein synthesis  as it regulates energy 
transfer within the plant, and the translocaton 
of sugars for plant growth or storage in grains 
and tubers. K is required for atmospheric N2–
fixation in legumes and is important for crop 
quality and disease resistance. Plants deficient 
in K show chlorosis (leaf margin scorch), are 
stunted and are more often prone to lodging 
(the bending of the stalk of a plant, called stalk 
lodging, or the entire plant, known as root 
lodging), and more susceptible to drought. K is 
taken up by plants as the ion K+.17
Plants access nutrients in the soil through 
a process called cation exchange. In order 
for this to occur the soil must be sufficiently 
moist, have a pH level and temperature within 
a certain range and the nutrients must be 
within the root zone of the plant. The optimum 
temperature, pH and soil moisture varies 
by plant species. Shortages of water and 
micronutrients can limit the efficient use of N 
and P.18 
Humus is the organic matter found in 
soil which develops as a result of the 
decomposition of plant and animal substances. 
The disintegration process allows components 
to be changed into forms usable by plants. 
Generally, the higher the humus content of the 
soil, the higher the response rate of mineral 
fertilisers, as organic matter in the soil acts 
as a key temporary storage for nutrients from 
fertilisers. Conversely, soils with a low humus 
content will respond poorly.19
Fertilisers, soil 
fertility and 
agriculture 
The link between soil fertility and agricultural 
production has been recognised since the 
beginning of recorded history. In Europe 
archaeological evidence has emerged of 
farmers using manure and water management 
techniques up to 8,000 years ago,20 and 
controlled flooding in the Nile and Tigris valleys 
made Egypt and Mesopotamia the bread-
baskets of the ancient world. In approximately 
500 BC the Greek historian Herodotus wrote 
about the very high crop yields obtained in 
the Tigris Valley and some 200 years later 
Theophrastus described efforts at holding flood 
waters on the land for as long as possible to 
maximise silt deposition.21
In ancient Egypt meticulous records of flooding 
and irrigation systems along the Nile Valley 
were kept for the purposes of calculating grain 
yields and potential tax revenues.22 In The 
Odyssey Homer refers to the application of 
animal manure to vineyards,23 while the Roman 
agricultural writer, Columella, pointed out the 
benefit of ploughing-in manure immediately, 
on the same day of its application, so as to 
maximise its effectiveness in the soil, and 
even compared the fertiliser value of different 
legume species.24
In 1669 the German alchemist Henning Brandt 
made the chemical discovery of phosphorus 
while attempting to find the philosopher’s 
stone by distilling 50 buckets of urine, 
through heating and evaporation. The stone 
remained elusive but in the process Brandt 
had discovered the pure form of phosphorus. 
However, it took a further two centuries before 
the importance of phosphorus in agriculture 
was recorded in Europe. In 1840 the German 
chemist, Leibig, proclaimed phosphorus to be 
the limiting nutrient in agriculture.25
The emergence of a coal-based economy in 
Europe and North America from the middle 
of the 18th century provided new sources of 
fossil nitrogen, a by-product of the coal tar 
industry, to supplement traditional sources. 26 
The first phosphate fertilisers came from the 
slag extracted from iron and steel production.27 
From 1840–1870 these industrial by-products 
were supplemented by an estimated 12 million 
tons of Peruvian guano. Reaching almost 150 
metres high on Peru’s Chincha islands, these 
vast deposits gave Peru a de facto monopoly on 
the world guano trade,28 the resultant boom 
trebled government revenues in 30 years and 
made Peru for a time the largest borrower in 
Latin America.29 
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Mining and the military were also big users 
of Nr compounds, such as dynamite, nitro-
glycerine and trinitrotoluene (TNT), which 
liberate their stored energy on detonation as 
they convert back to unreactive N2 gas.30 The 
development of the South African fertiliser 
industry was an offshoot of the mining boom 
of the late 19th century, which required large 
quantities of explosives and other chemicals.31
Around the turn of the 20th century calls were 
being made by the scientific establishment 
in Western Europe to develop new chemical 
processes which could convert N2 to Nr. 
Among the first techniques developed was 
the arc process, where N2 was oxidised to NOx, 
producing nitric acid (NHO3). The same process 
happens in the internal combustion engine of a 
motor car. However, the process was extremely 
energy intensive and therefore cost effective 
only with a cheap source of electricity. Norsk-
Hydro, later to become fertiliser giant Yara, was 
one of the first companies to manufacture 
fertilisers in this way.
In 1908 Fritz Haber discovered a process, 
later up-scaled by the engineer Carl Bosch, to 
combine N2 and hydrogen (H2) directly, first 
from coal gasification and later from natural 
gas. The Haber-Bosch process dramatically 
reduced the energy costs of producing nitrogen 
fertilisers, and has been called the ‘greatest 
single experiment in global geo-engineering 
ever made.’ By the 1930s, nitrogen produced 
using this process exceeded fossil nitrogen 
sources being used world-wide.32 
At the end of the Second World War many 
countries, particularly the United States, were 
in possession of huge stockpiles of various 
chemicals used in their respective munitions 
industries. In the United States the huge 
output of explosives from the munitions plant 
at Muscle Shoals, Alabama was converted to 
producing nitrogen-based fertilisers, primarily 
for use in maize production.33 Global fertiliser 
consumption increased more than tenfold 
in the ensuing decades, from 14 million tons 
annually in 1950 to 144 million tons in 1988. 
Though overall consumption fell in the early 
1990s (due to an 80% drop in consumption 
in the former USSR) it had reached over 180 
million tons annually by 2012.34
Fertiliser types
Nitrogen (N)
Synthetic N fertilisers come in two principle 
forms, liquid ammonium and solid urea. 
Ammonia is derived from natural gas and 
air in the Haber-Bosch process, while urea 
comes from ammonia and carbon dioxide 
using the Bosch-Meiser process. Urea is 
measured by its nitrogen content, with 1 
ton of nitrogen found in every 2.14 tons of 
urea.35 Urea is the most commonly applied 
N fertiliser, although compound NPK blends 
are also common. Other N fertilisers include 
anhydrous ammonia, calcium ammonium 
nitrate, ammonium nitrate and ammonium 
sulfate. N-based fertilisers are the most 
energy intensive of all fertiliser components 
and their manufacture accounts for 3–5% 
of global natural gas use and 2% of global 
energy demand.36 
Natural gas is the most important ingredient 
in the manufacture of N-based fertilisers, 
hence the price of fertilisers is heavily 
influenced by the price of natural gas (and 
also crude oil). For example, from 2000 to 
2008 the price of natural gas increased by 
105%. Over the same period ammonia prices 
increased 211%, while urea increased by 
409%.37
Phosphorus (P)
Unlike other essential macronutrients 
required by living organisms, such as 
carbon, nitrogen or hydrogen, the natural 
phosphorus cycle has no atmospheric phase,
http://www.coha.org/the-great-peruvian-guano-bonanza-rise-fall-
and-legacy/ 
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meaning phosphorus sources are far more 
geographically restricted. Phosphorus has no 
substitute in food production and its main 
source, phosphate rock, is a non-renewable 
resource that takes approximately 10-15 
million years to form. Phosphorus has 
numerous uses, from the manufacture 
of munitions to chemical detergents, but 
around 90% of global use is accounted for 
by agriculture. Tradable fertilisers based on 
phosphorus are diammonium phosphate 
(DAP), monoammonium phosphate (MAP) 
and triple-super phosphate (TSP).38
Potassium
Potassium makes up 2.5% of the Earth’s 
crust, making it the seventh most common 
element. However, due to its high reactivity 
and affinity for other elements it is not 
available to plants in its elemental form.39 
All fertiliser potassium (commonly known 
as Potash) is manufactured from large 
deposits of water-soluble K minerals 
that have accumulated as a result of the 
evaporation of shallow seas or natural lakes 
over geological time. The most commonly 
available K fertilisers are potassium chloride 
(KCl) containing 60% K2O and potassium 
sulfate (K2SO4), which contains 50% K2O.40
Multi-nutrient fertilisers
There are three main types of multi-nutrient 
fertiliser. Complex multi-nutrient fertilisers 
are designed for horticulture where high-
grade (and costly) fertilisers are required. 
These are considered too costly for Sub-
Saharan Africa. Compound fertilisers are 
manufactured by mixing compatible straight 
fertilisers to produce a slurry from which 
a granulated product is prepared. These 
are less costly than complex fertilisers. 
Finally, bulk blend fertilisers are prepared 
by physically mixing different fertilisers to 
arrive at a specific nutrient composition. 
These are the cheapest of the three types 
of fertiliser. Compound and bulk blends are 
often produced for specific crops such as 
8-14-7 (maize) or 5-18-10 (cotton) but there 
are also more generic mixes that can be used 
with a wide variety of crops.
Figure 1: Fertiliser raw ingredients and products
Source: Yara, 2014.
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The global fertiliser 
industry
Extreme levels of concentration and huge 
economies of scale characterise the global 
fertiliser industry. In 2012 global sales of NPK 
blended fertilisers alone were over US$200 
billion,41 while the global phosphorus fertiliser 
market was worth an estimated US$96 billion. 
In comparison, the global crop protection 
market (insecticides, fungicides and herbicides) 
in 2013 was US$75 billion.42 The two biggest 
fertiliser companies by revenue (according to 
a Yara report) are Agrium and Yara, who made 
approximately US$16.5 billion and US$15 billion 
respectively during 2012.43 
Production is highly concentrated between 
both countries and corporations, reflecting 
the economies of scale needed and access to a 
steady supply of raw materials. 44 The top five 
countries control more than 50% of production 
capacity for the main nitrogen, phosphate and 
potash fertilisers. Production within countries 
is also highly concentrated. With China being 
the exception, within the largest producer 
countries of ammonia, urea, DAP/MAP, potash 
and NPK the top four firms control over 50% of 
production capacity.45
These market characteristics lend themselves 
to cartel-like behaviour which has a long 
history in the global fertiliser industry, dating 
back to the 1880s. According to a report from 
the American Antitrust Institute, the fertiliser 
industry accounted for 12% of all identified 
international cartels between 1902 and 2010. 
Twenty such cartels were in operation from 
1990 to 2010.
Global markets in potash and phosphorus are 
still dominated by cartels, and may be best 
viewed as duopolies. For potash, 70% of global 
trade is controlled by two such cartels: the first 
is Canadian sanctioned export cartel Canpotex, 
comprising PotashCorp, Mosaic and Agrium, 
while the second comprises three producers 
from the former Soviet Union, Belaruskali, 
Silvinit and Uralkali. Their shares in the global 
potash market are 61% and 32% respectively. 
The phosphorus duopoly is comprised of 
US export cartel Phoschem (PotashCorp 
and Mosaic), which accounts for 52% of 
world phosphorus trade, and the Moroccan 
monoploly OCP, which controls 36% of the 
global raw phosphate market and 51% of global 
phosphoric acid sales.46
Figure 2: Top 10 global fertiliser companies by net income, 2009–2012
Company Net income 
2009 (US$ 
millions)
Net income 
2012 (US$ 
millions)
% Change  
2009–2012
Potashcorp (Canada) 988 2,079 110
Mosiac (USA) 414 1,839 344
Yara (Norway) 613 1,823 197
CF Industries (USA) 449 1,817 305
Uralkali (Russia) 451 1,574 249
ICL (Israel) 724 1,461 102
Agrium (Canada) 366 1,329 263
K+S (Germany) 403 885 120
SQM (Chile) 372 666 79
APC (Jordan) 281 353 26
Total 5,061 13,826 173
Source: Potash Corp (2009, 2012).
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An investigation by the American Antitrust 
Institute found that the average profits on 
potash sales for Canpotex members were 196% 
from 2008–2009, peaking at a staggering 
480% in mid-2008. The institute has concluded 
that overall damages arising from the 
fertiliser duopolies are “likely to amount to 
tens of billions of dollars annually” and stated 
“corporate and political control of essential 
plant nutrients may be one of the most severe 
competition issues facing national economies 
today.”47
According to the UN FAO the total demand 
for fertiliser nutrients is expected to grow by 
1.9% per annum from 2012 until 2016, to reach 
a total demand of 194.1 million tons. However, 
the annual global demand for phosphate and 
potash are expected to grow by 2% and 3.7% 
respectively, compared with a 1.3% annual 
increase in Nitrogen demand.48
To meet this demand, the International 
Fertiliser Association (IFA) expects the 
development of 58 new urea plants between 
2010 and 2015. Rising natural gas prices in the 
Middle East (which currently accounts for 32% 
of global urea exports) have spurred interest 
in exploiting natural gas sources in Africa (see 
below). Presently, 50% of global urea capacity 
is not utilised (the figure rises to 70% for South 
Africa).49
The phosphate and potash sectors, where 
resources are more geographically (and 
nationally) concentrated, has seen a flurry 
of investments, mergers and acquisitions in 
recent years, as multinational corporations and 
Figure 3: Top global fertiliser producers by country
Fertiliser Top 5 producer countries
(% global share)
Top 5 countries 
capacity (000 MT)
Top 5 countries share of 
global production (%)  
Ammonia China (22.8), India (8.9), Russia (8.5), 
USA (6.5), Indonesia (3.9)
84,183 50.6
Urea China (33.1), India (13.1), Indonesia 
(5.4), Russia (4.2), USA (4.1)
95,802 59.9
AN USA (15.4), Russia (14.7), China (7.7), 
Uzbekistan (4.8), Romania (4.5)
27,770 47.1
DAP/MAP China (22.3), USA (21.2), India (11.4), 
Russia (6.0 
22,896 65.9
Phosphoric 
acid
United States (20.9), China (19.3), 
Morocco (9.6), Russia (6.2), and India 
(5.3)
28,274 61.3
Potash Canada (37.6), Russia (13.2), Belarus 
(9.9), Germany (8.2), and China (7.7)
39,687 76.7
NPK China (29.3), India (8.2), Russia (6.0), 
France (4.0), and Turkey (3.0)
47,186 50.4
Source: IFPRI, 2011.
http://www.canpotex.com/img/images/l/pbt_aerial_l.jpg 
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national governments seek both to consolidate 
existing reserves and open up new ones. Given 
that mining forms a major component of both 
industries, it is unsurprising that some of the 
world’s largest mining companies, including 
BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto, have entered the 
fray.
BHP, the largest mining company in the world, 
signalled its intentions in August 2010 with 
a massive US$40 billion hostile takeover bid 
for Canada’s Potash Corporation, at the time 
the world’s most profitable fertiliser company. 
However, the Canadian government considered 
Potash Corp and the potash reserves it held as 
a matter of national interest, and rejected the 
bid. In a further twist, in September 2010, seven 
different law firms associated with the deal, 
and Canada’s Finance Ministry and Treasury 
Board were subject to a series of cyber-attacks 
linked to a Chinese effort to block the takeover. 
At the time a report in the Financial Times 
claimed that China’s formerly state-owned 
chemical company, Sinochem Group, with 
backing from the Chinese government, had 
hired Deustche Bank and Citigroup to disrupt 
BHP’s bid for Potash Corp.50
In the interim, BHP has committed to investing 
up to US$12 billion at its Jansen site in 
Saskatchewan, potentially the largest potash 
mine in the world.51 More recently speculation 
has been rife that BHP intends to use its Jansen 
assets as leverage in another attempt on 
Potash Corp, with industry analysts predicting 
an imminent US$1 billion offer for a 3% stake 
in the Canadian fertiliser giant. Far from being 
cowed by overtures from BHP Billiton, Potash 
Corp has itself been eyeing potential purchases, 
including an attempted US$13 billion takeover 
of Israel based ICL. However, opposition from 
the Israeli government and trade union groups 
have put paid to the deal.52
Meanwhile, in September 2013, China’s 
sovereign wealth fund spent US$2 billion 
to acquire a 12.5% stake in Russian potash 
producer Uralkali. China currently imports 6 
million tons of potash a year, more than 10% 
of global demand. The investment is seen as a 
means to ensure a continued supply of potash 
and of strengthening China’s bargaining 
position with other producers.53
Brazilian mining giant Vale, the world’s largest 
iron-ore producer, bought Rio Tinto’s potash 
Figure 4: Anticipated increases in African fertiliser supply and demand, 2012–2016
Source: FAO, 2012.
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reserves in Canada and Brazil in 2009, and 
followed up in early 2010 by purchasing grain 
trader Bunge’s Brazilian fertiliser assets. The 
deal included phosphate rock mines and 
Bunge’s 43% stake in Fosfertile, the largest 
supplier of phosphate and nitrogen-based 
fertilisers in Brazil. According to Alberto 
Weisser, CEO of Bunge, Brazilian President 
Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva had put “tremendous 
pressure” on Vale to expand its fertiliser 
presence in Brazil.54
Rio Tinto re-entered the Canadian potash scene 
in 2011 in a joint venture with Russian producer 
JSC Acron (which emerged from privatisation of 
the Soviet fertiliser industry). Both companies 
have recently announced they are sitting on 
massive deposits in Saskatchewan, and expect 
to start developing the site by 2017.55
Even Bill Gates has interests in fertiliser 
beyond his support for the Alliance for a Green 
Revolution in Africa (AGRA). Through his private 
investment vehicle, Cascade Investments, 
Gates is now the largest single shareholder 
(12%) in the Canadian National Railway (CNR),56 
one of the two major haulers of potash from 
the mines of Saskatchewan to the west coast 
ports of Canada.57 Approximately 17% of CNR’s 
freight is grain and fertilisers. In 2012 CNR 
signed a ten year contract with Canpotex Ltd 
for transporting potash to North Vancouver. In 
January 2013 Cascade investments, together 
with two other US groups, was part of a US$1 
billion investment in Egyptian construction 
and fertiliser company OCI NV, a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Orascom Construction Industries 
SAE, the largest publicly traded company in 
Egypt at the time.58
Fertiliser in Sub-
Saharan Africa 
In global terms, Sub-Saharan Africa’s fertiliser 
consumption is marginal. In 2011 it accounted 
for 1.6% of global nitrogen consumption, 1.6% 
of phosphate and 1.3% of potash. According 
to the UN FAO, between 2012 and 2016 the 
consumption of nitrogen, phosphate and 
potash for fertilisers is expected to increase 
at an annual rate of 2.9%, 3.7% and 4.2% 
respectively. The major fertiliser consumers in 
Sub-Saharan Africa are South Africa, Nigeria, 
Kenya, Ethiopia and Malawi.59
The production of fertiliser in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (excluding South Africa) is concentrated 
among four countries: Zimbabwe, Senegal, 
Figure 5: Fertiliser production capacity in Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa) 2008–
2009
Fertiliser Top 5 producer countries      (% 
Sub-Saharan Africa share)
Largest 
producers 
capacity 
(000 MT)
Largest 
producers 
share of Sub-
Saharan Africa 
(%)
Largest 
producers 
global 
share (%)
Ammonia Nigeria (82), Zimbabwe (18) 443 100 0.3
Urea Nigeria (100) 500 100 0.3
AN Zimbabwe (100) 250 100 0.4
DAP/MAP Senegal (100) 120 100 0.3
Phosphoric 
acid
Senegal (90.8), Zimbabwe 
(5.5.), Tanzania (3.7)
727 100 1.6
NPK Cote d’Ivoire (41.2), Senegal 
(27.8), Zimbabwe (25.8), 
Malawi (5.2)
970 100 1
Source: IFPRI, 2011.
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Nigeria and Mauritius. Production within 
these countries is carried out by handful 
of corporations; no more than four firms 
operate in any of the producing countries of 
Sub-Saharan Africa. In most cases there is 
only one firm operating. For example, Notore 
Chemical industries control all the ammonia 
and urea production in Nigeria; Sable Chemical 
industries account for all Zimbabwe’s ammonia 
production; Industries Chimiques produce 
all the phosphoric acid and NPK output for 
Senegal; and Yara International controls the 
market for NPK production in Cote d’Ivoire.60
North Africa has substantial phosphate 
rock and natural gas resources. While Egypt, 
Morocco and Tunisia account for 88% of 
Africa’s fertiliser production, the majority of 
this is exported. South Africa produces 90% 
of its phosphate fertiliser requirements.61 
There is currently no commercial production 
of potassium anywhere in Africa. In addition 
to current manufacture, fertiliser imports by 
Sub-Saharan Africa account for close to 100% 
of consumption for the three major fertiliser 
groups (nitrogen, phosphate and potash).62
Phosphate and plunder in ‘Africa’s last 
colony’63 
Western Sahara has been under illegal 
occupation by Morocco since the latter’s 
invasion in 1975. Morocco’s claim to 
sovereignty over Western Sahara is not 
recognised by any state, the United Nations 
or the International Court of Justice. The 
Bou Craa phosphate deposits and mining 
activities in the area provide Morocco 
with the largest phosphate reserves in the 
world and makes it the world’s third largest 
producer. From 2009–2013 production 
and export from Western Sahara averaged 
2.3–2.5 million tons annually, approximately 
10% of OCP’s total sales. The conveyor belt 
that transports the phosphate rock from 
the mines at Bou Craa to the coast is the 
longest in the world. OCP has developed an 
investment plan worth US$2.45 billion for 
the period 2012–2013 to expand and upgrade 
production.
A report from Western Sahara Resource 
Watch (WSRW) estimated that during 2012 
and 2013 4 million tons of phosphate rock 
was exported from Western Sahara, giving 
US$510 million in revenue to OCP. Potash 
Corp was the largest individual buyer over 
this period, sourcing over 1 million tons at a 
cost of US$162 million. Lithuanian fertiliser 
company Lifosa, a subsidiary of Russia’s 
Eurochem, purchased 575,000 tons to the 
value of US$92 million over the same period. 
Agrium, who signed a 1 million ton per year 
contract with OCP in 2011, imported 170,000 
tons (worth US$26 million) in 2013.64
Fertiliser supply chains in Africa
In Africa, where little fertiliser is domestically 
produced, the fertiliser supply chain begins 
with importers (who will interact with shipping 
agents, bankers, quality inspectors and various 
other players) and ends with farmers. Farmers 
in landlocked African countries typically pay 
an extra US$50–US$100 per metric ton (MT) in 
transportation and other costs.65 Due to limited 
capacity at many African ports, most fertiliser 
imports arrive in 10,000 ton vessels, limiting 
the size of bulk orders and adding a 10–15% 
cost premium.66 Wanzala, Bumb and Groot 
(Fertiliser market development in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, 2013) have identified five basic fertiliser 
supply chain models found in Africa: 
1. A liberalised market where importers 
procure fertiliser from overseas and sell 
mainly to wholesalers/distributors. Some is 
also sold directly to agro-dealers, an example 
being Uganda, where the wholesale level has 
The political economy of Africa’s burgeoning chemical fertiliser rush    19
not developed. Agro-dealers then either sell 
directly to small-scale farmers or to stockists, 
who sell to farmers.
2. A ‘mature’ market, where fertiliser is 
domestically produced and distributed 
through a well-developed commercial value 
chain. In Sub-Saharan Africa only South 
Africa falls into this category.
3. Typical contract farming arrangements 
found in export cash crop sectors, such as 
tea and sugar in Kenya, tobacco in Malawi or 
cotton in West Africa. Here, companies either 
import fertilisers themselves or through 
local agents. The fertiliser is supplied on 
credit and deducted from farmer payments 
(along with other inputs) at harvest time.
4. Found where NGOs procure fertilisers from 
overseas as part of their projects, and then 
distribute directly to farmers they work 
with (for free, at a discount, or on credit). 
Alternatively, NGOs assist farmer groups to 
procure fertilisers and then sell on to their 
members (at a discount) or to non-members 
at the going rate.
5. In countries with national fertiliser 
programmes, government owned enterprises 
procure either directly from overseas or via 
local importers using a tender process. In the 
majority of cases fertilisers are distributed 
via government parastatals or ministries of 
agriculture.67
Current fertiliser 
players in Africa
A number of fertiliser companies are currently 
active in Sub-Saharan Africa. At present 
Yara has the largest presence of the major 
multinational companies and, owing to its 
intimate involvement in the Green Revolution 
push, will be profiled in more detail below. 
US fertiliser giant Mosaic’s only significant 
intervention in Africa so far appears to be 
through its involvement with the Millennium 
Village Project, to which it claims to donate 
US$2 million worth of fertiliser each year.68 
Several large firms from the former Soviet 
Union and the Middle East have been assisting 
the Ethiopian government with its fertiliser 
subsidy programme.69 Commodity trader 
Louis Dreyfus is one of the largest distributors 
of fertilisers and agro-chemicals in West 
Africa and in 2013 established new fertiliser 
Figure 6: Fertiliser imports in Africa, 1995–2011
Source: AfricanFertilizer, 2014.
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operations in Nigeria, Kenya, Tanzania and 
Zambia.70 
Some of the larger operators currently on the 
continent are African companies. Whether 
these companies will compete directly with, 
enter into partnership with, or simply be 
swallowed whole by the global companies 
remains to be seen.
Notore Chemical Industries
Notore Chemical Industries took over the 
assets of the National Fertiliser Company of 
Nigeria (NOFCON) in 2005. In 2006 Notore 
signed a 20-year supply contract with the 
Nigerian gas company and commenced 
ammonia production in 2009. In recent years 
Notore has further expanded its scope, having 
signed a technical advisory service agreement 
with Tata chemicals of India in 2011, and a 
joint venture agreement with Mitsubishi 
Corporation of Japan in 2012, to build a 
new plant.71 The African private equity firm, 
Emerging Capital Partners, currently has an 11% 
stake in Notore.72
OCP Group SA
OCP Group SA is based in Morocco. It controls 
the world’s largest reserves of phosphate, is 
the world’s largest exporter of phosphate, 
and accounts for roughly 21% of the global 
phosphorus-based fertiliser market. In 2013 
its turnover was approximately 46 billion 
Moroccan dirhams (US$5.5 billion). OCP has big 
plans for Africa—between 2007 and 2012 its 
fertiliser exports to the continent had already 
increased tenfold, from 50,000–506,000 tons.73 
In April 2014 OCP raised US$1.55 billion in its 
debut international bond sale in support of 
a planned US$17 billion investment plan to 
increase its global market share for phosphorus 
fertilisers to 40% by 2020. In March 2014 OCP 
signed an agreement to build four plants in 
Morocco and Gabon at a cost of US$2 billion, 
intended to supply 30% of the African fertiliser 
market.74
Omnia
Omnia fertiliser is part of the Omnia group 
of companies, a South African group with 
interests in mining, explosives, chemicals and 
fertilisers. It has offices serving southern Africa 
in South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Angola 
and Mozambique. It also operates (through its 
head office in South Africa) in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Botswana, Namibia, Ethiopia 
and Kenya.75
In South Africa Omnia has recently benefited 
from state support via the Industrial 
Development Corporation (IDC), a parastatal 
agency. In 20111 the IDC committed R250 
million towards the construction of a new R1.4 
billion nitric acid plant at Omnia’s Sasolburg 
site.76 As of 31st March 2014, 14% of Omnia is 
held by South Africa’s government employees 
pension fund through the Public Investment 
Corporation (PIC).77
In Zambia Omnia was one of two key 
suppliers to the government’s fertiliser 
subsidy programme.78 However, in June 2013 
the Zambian Competition and Consumer 
Protection Commission (CCPC) recommended 
the blacklisting of both companies regarding 
the supply of fertiliser to the Farm Input 
Subsidy Programme (FISP). This followed an 
extensive CCPC investigation which revealed 
that cartelistic behaviour and bid rigging by 
Omnia and Nyiombo had cost the government 
over US$20 million.79
Export Trading Group (ETG) 
Founded in Kenya in 1967, the Export Trading 
Group (ETG) now has a presence in 30 countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa and sells its Falcon 
fertiliser brand in 20 African countries. The 
group has built a fertiliser granulation plant in 
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Beira, Mozambique, and has plans to acquire 
a blending plant in Tanzania in 2014. ETG also 
operates a bulk blending plant in Zambia, 
primarily to service commercial farmers. 80 In 
late 2012 international asset management firm 
the Carlyle Group, South African private equity 
fund Pembani Remgro and Standard Chartered 
announced plans to make a strategic minority 
investmen’ of US$210 million in ETG.
Future fertiliser 
trends in Sub-
Saharan Africa
Two major pathways are likely to determine 
fertiliser demand and production in Sub-
Saharan Africa in the near future. These include 
efforts to increase consumption among 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s hundreds of millions of 
small-scale farmers through the new Green 
Revolution push, and a parallel scramble for 
the continent’s resources that, so far, is most 
closely associated with extractive industries, 
both fossil fuels and other minerals. At their 
core both developments are the inevitable 
consequence of capital’s never-ending quest 
for new market opportunities. However, 
politics and ideology are inherent in both, 
even if they differ between the more brazen 
resource nationalism of the extractives sector 
and the philanthropic overtures of the Green 
Revolution.
Africa’s coming 
extractives boom
The African continent is said to be teetering 
on the edge of a natural gas boom and Angola, 
Gabon, Mozambique, Nigeria and Tanzania 
in particular are the focus of developments 
in this sector.81 Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Namibia, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) and Madagascar 
are also said to have considerable reserves of 
natural gas. Recent discoveries off the coast 
of East Africa have led to predictions that the 
region could eventually become the world’s 
third largest exporter of natural gas. Should 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports take off, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) expects 
between US$20 billion and US$30 billion in 
foreign direct investment in Tanzania alone.82 
To put this in perspective, the World Bank 
calculated Tanzania’s GDP to be US$28.2 billion 
in 2012.83
However, the construction of a modern 
ammonia/urea plant requires an investment 
of up to US$1 billion and must produce 
between 1,500 and 3,500 tonnes per day to be 
economically viable. With over 50% of countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa currently consuming 
less than 50,000 tonnes in a year, many of the 
anticipated fertiliser plants could quickly turn 
their attention to lucrative export markets.
In Nigeria, currently the only producer of urea 
on the continent, several local and Indian 
firms have advanced plans which could see 
production increase by tenfold, from its 
current level of 500,000 tons. This includes 
plans by Dangote to construct Africa’s largest 
fertiliser plant at a cost of US$2 billion. The 
plant, scheduled to start production in 2014, 
will have a production capacity of up to 7,700 
tons per day of ammonia-urea fertiliser. Eleme 
Petrochemicals, backed by the Indorama 
Corporation of Indonesia, has also announced 
plans for a 2,500 ton per day plant to be 
constructed at Port Harcourt.84
The government of Gabon, together with 
Indian (Tata) and Singaporean (Olam) investors, 
is in the advanced stage of a feasibility 
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assessment for a urea plant with an annual 
capacity of 1.3 million tons. Fatima Group, 
Pakistan’s third largest agricultural input 
company, has been scouting various African 
countries ahead of a planned US$1 billion 
investment in a world scale fertiliser plant. In 
addition to catering for local markets, surplus 
production from the plant has been earmarked 
for export to Pakistan, where urea production is 
unsufficent to meet local demand.85
In Lusophone Africa Japanese firms are leading 
the way, a group of which winning a US$1.3 
billion contract in 2011 to build a fertiliser plant 
in Angola with a capacity of 666,000 tons of 
ammonia and 580,000 tons of urea per year. 
Half of the ammonia will be exported while all 
of the urea will be for domestic consumption. 
However, lack of local demand may increase 
the export focus of the project.86 In 2013 
Sumitomo Corporation and Toyo Engineering 
announced plans to invest US$1.2 billion over 
the next four years to build a 630,000 ton per 
year fertiliser plant in Mozambique.87
UK listed Wentworth Resources plans to build 
a US$360 million urea plant in Tanzania, to 
be supplied by a proposed 400MW gas-fired 
power plant in Mtwara, in the south of the 
country. The power plant, which will cost 
close to US$1 billion, will be built by the US 
consortium of Symbion Power and General 
Electric.88 Also in East Africa, Japanese firm 
Toyota Tsushu has been awarded the tender 
to construct a US$1.2 billion fertiliser plant 
in Nakuru, Kenya. The plant is expected to be 
completed in 2016.89
Indian companies, seeking new fertiliser 
sources, have also been scouring the African 
continent. Indian state-owned Rashtriya 
Chemicals and Fertilisers Ltd (RCF) has signed 
a memorandum of understanding with the 
government of Ghana and is seeking long-
term natural gas supplies for the production of 
urea. It is also looking at sourcing phosphate 
fertilisers from Togo.90
In Ethiopia five fertiliser plants are currently 
under construction in Yavy, some 330km west 
of the capital Addis Ababa, at a total cost of 
over US$2.8 billion. The plants will have an 
annual production capacity of 330,000 tons 
and are expected to begin production in 2017. 
The project is being led by the state-owned 
Ethiopian Metal and Engineering Corporation. 91
Substantial phosphate reserves have also 
been identified in Mozambique and Namibia. 
Brazilian miner Vale estimates Mozambique’s 
reserves of apatite to be as high as 155 million 
MT, making it the largest known reserve in 
Central or East Africa. Some 60km off the coast 
of Namibia the Australian owned Sandpiper 
marine phosphate project is sitting on what 
it suspects to be the world’s largest marine 
reserve of phosphate rock, at 1.7 billion MT, 
including an initial reserve of 133 million MT. As 
no other country in the world conducts marine 
phosphate mining, in September 2013 the 
government of Namibia placed an 18-month 
moratorium on marine phosphate mining, 
pending the outcome of an environmental 
impact assessment into potential impacts on 
the Namibian fishing industry.92
Fertiliser and the 
Green Revolution 
push in Africa
Just as in Asia, ambitions for an African Green 
Revolution are premised on dramatic increases 
in the use of fertiliser, as well as improved 
seed, access to credit and markets. This is most 
clearly expressed in the Abuja Declaration 
on Fertilisers of 2006, a process fashioned 
in meetings that included the Rockefeller 
Foundation and the global fertiliser industry. 
http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?p=102424622 
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The Abuja Declaration called for fertiliser 
use across the continent to rise from 8kg per 
ha at the time, to 50kg per ha by 2015. The 
Declaration has acted as a rallying point for the 
dizzying array of players working on fertilisers 
in Africa, from the long established IFDC and 
USAID, to more recent initiatives such as the 
Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) 
or the G8’s New Alliance for Food Security and 
Nutrition.
The Green Revolutions of Latin America and 
Asia during the 1960s and 1970s were based 
on a holy trinity of improved seed, synthetic 
fertilisers and irrigation. The use of these inputs 
was made possible through the extension of 
agricultural credit, which integrated more and 
more peasant farmers into the formal (and 
informal) cash economy. Fertiliser use in South 
Asia almost trebled between 1980–1981 and 
2000–2001, from 37kg per ha to 109kg per ha. 
By contrast, fertiliser use change over the same 
period in Sub-Saharan Africa was negligible, 
rising from 8kg per ha to only 9kg per ha.93
Contrary to popular opinion, attempts 
were made to replicate this original Green 
Revolution package on African soil. During 
the 1960s and 1970s several international 
research centres were established under 
the umbrella of the Consultative Group on 
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). 
These included the International Institute for 
Tropical Agriculture (IITA) in Ibadan, Nigeria 
(1967), the West Africa Rice Development 
Association (WARDA), now known as the 
Africa Rice Centre, in Contonoum, Benin (1970), 
and the International Council for Research 
in Agroforestry (ICRAF) with headquarters 
in Nairobi, Kenya (1978).94 That these efforts 
failed to replicate what was happening in Asia 
and Latin America, and the reasons for this 
disappointment, were not explicitly outlined 
for some time.
Acknowledgement of some of the 
shortcomings of the Green Revolution as a 
model for Africa began to emerge during 
the late 1990s. Sir Gordon Conway’s book, 
The Doubly Green Revolution: Food for All in 
the 21st Century, published shortly before 
Conway assumed his post as president of the 
Rockefeller Foundation, stressed the more 
marginal and diverse conditions present in 
African agriculture compared with Asia, and 
the need to make more efficient use of local 
resources.95 
In 2001 Joe Devries and Gary Toennissen 
released Securing the Harvest, which echoed 
many of Conway’s early thoughts and also 
acknowledged that prior to the roll out of the 
Green Revolution in Asia there already existed 
a layer of better off farmers who were able to 
adopt the technological package. Both Devries 
and Toennissen have long associations with the 
Rockefeller Foundation, and both were highly 
influential in the formation of the Alliance for a 
Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA).96
This shift in thinking in the development 
community coincided with political shifts in 
Africa itself. This was the era of the African 
Renaissance envisaged by former South 
African president, Thabo Mbeki, which saw the 
Organisation for African Unity (OAU) morph 
into the African Union (AU), and the creation 
of NEPAD and its offshoot, the Comprehensive 
African Agricultural Development Programme 
(CAADP). The second ordinary session of the AU 
was held in Maputo in July 2003 when CAADP 
was approved and the Maputo Declaration on 
Agriculture and Food Security was endorsed. 
Among other stipulations, the Declaration 
called for African governments to commit 10% 
of their annual budgets to agriculture.97
From the beginning fertiliser was seen as a 
priority by CAADP. At the regional conference 
of the UN FAO for Africa in March 2004, 
African governments adopted a resolution 
on the development of a fertiliser industry in 
Africa, in support of CAADP. Assistance was 
requested from the FAO and IFDC to assess all 
the fertiliser plants in Africa and calculate the 
costs of making the continent self-sufficient 
in terms of fertiliser supplies by 2015, through 
the upgrade of existing plants and the 
establishment of new factories.98
The Abuja Declaration
One of the first major initiatives to emerge 
from the new CAADP process was the African 
Fertiliser Summit in Abuja, Nigeria, in 2006. The 
Summit had been organised over the course of 
a year by NEPAD, the IFDC and local organising 
committees in Nigeria, and counted among 
its sponsors the Rockefeller Foundation, the 
International Fertiliser Industry Association 
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(IFA) and USAID.99 The resulting Declaration, 
made on the 13th June 2006, calls for fertiliser 
use in Africa to increase from 8kg per ha per 
year to 50kg per ha per year by 2015, through 
the development of infrastructure and policy, 
and a focus on production and finance. An 
abridged version of the Abuja Declaration 
appears below. The complete version appears 
as Annexure 2 on page 44.
The Abuja Declaration on Fertiliser for a 
Green Revolution in Africa (abridged) 
1. African Union member states resolve to 
increase fertiliser use from the current 8kg 
per ha to an average of at least 50kg per ha 
by 2015;
2. By mid 2007, fertiliser procurement costs 
at regional and national levels should be 
reduced by harmonisation of polices and 
removal of fertiliser taxes and tariffs;
3. By mid 2007, governments must increase 
fertiliser access through developing and 
scaling up input dealer and community-
based networks;
4. By 2007 AU member states must 
address the needs of women farmers, 
youth, farmers associations, civil society 
associations and the private sector;
5. Targeted subsidies with special attention 
on poor farmers;
6. Accelerated investments in infrastructure, 
fiscal incentives and farmer organisations 
to improve output market incentives;
7. The establishment of national financing 
facilities for input suppliers to accelerate 
access to credit, particularly for women;
8. The establishment of regional fertiliser 
procurement and distribution facilities;
9. The promotion of national and regional 
fertiliser production and inter-regional 
fertiliser trade;
10. Improved access to quality seeds, irrigation, 
extension services, market information 
and soil nutrient mapping;
11. The establishment, by 2007, of an African 
Fertiliser Funding Mechanism;
12. Regular progress reports to be delivered 
to African heads of state at every sixth-
monthly AU Summit.
Despite all the talk of NEPAD and CAADP 
processes being “African owned and African 
led”, the fingerprints of the global fertiliser 
industry appear all over the Abuja Declaration. 
Prior to the Summit technical meetings had 
been held in Johannesburg in November 2005 
and in Abuja in February 2006. Members of 
the technical advisory committee included 
representatives from the IFDC, the Rockefeller 
Foundation, Yara, the Forum for Agricultural 
Research in Africa (FARA) and the Fertiliser 
Society of South Africa (FSSA). An eminent 
persons advisory group meeting was held 
in March 2006 in New York City, chaired by 
Nigerian president Olesegun Obasanjo and 
hosted by Dr Judith Rodin, president of the 
Rockefeller Foundation.100
It is difficult to draw any conclusions about 
progress to date towards the targets of the 
Abuja Declaration. African agricultural statistics 
are notoriously unreliable,101 while the most 
recently published progress report (required 
by Resolution 12) is for the 2011 calendar year. 
Further, of the 53 AU member states to whom 
questionnaires were sent, only 13 replied: 
Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Mali, Nigeria, Seychelles and Uganda. What 
information can be gleaned should be taken as 
indicative rather than authoritative. In addition, 
more recent coverage on the thematic areas 
covered in the Declaration is available from the 
various organisations working on fertilisers.
The overall goal of raising average 
consumption to 50kg per ha appears a long 
way off, however. Data quoted in the 2011 
progress report reveals that in 2009 only five 
African countries “came close to or exceeded” 
the target of 50kg per ha.102 Using more recent 
data from 2012, AGRA’s African Agriculture 
Status Report 2013 provides a continental 
average of 11kg per ha for fertiliser usage. Even 
this figure is probably inflated, as it includes 
South Africa’s average consumption of 48kg 
The political economy of Africa’s burgeoning chemical fertiliser rush    25
per ha.103 Considering the data that had been 
gathered, the report deemed progress to 
December 2011 had been satisfactory, but that 
there was “room for much improvement”.104
In terms of farmer access, a general rise in the 
numbers of agro-dealers selling fertilisers since 
2007 was reported, and an overall reduction in 
distances travelled; but of the 13 countries that 
responded in 2011, only four (Burundi, Ethiopia, 
Ethiopia and Lesotho) reported average 
travelling distances (for farmers to access 
fertiliser) of less than 10km, and only three 
(Kenya, Nigeria and the Seychelles) reported the 
availability of fertiliser in 10kg bags (as opposed 
to the industry standard of 50kg bags).
Policy
Within the policy space, 13 countries105 reported 
the establishment of a formal policy describing 
fertiliser use together with an accompanying 
regulatory framework. Given that fertiliser 
regulations feature prominently in many of 
the G8 New Alliance country cooperation 
frameworks’, it is clear that progress on this 
is still deemed necessary. However, in parallel 
processes involving seed policies in Africa, 
fertiliser policy has been championed at the 
regional level through the continent’s various 
RECs.
Shortly after the Abuja Declaration was made 
there was some talk of the creation of a Joint 
Fertiliser Procurement Initiative (JFPI) between 
the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) and the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA). However, 
information on this remains sketchy; COMESA 
appears to have proceeded alone on this 
for the time being, its agricultural ministers 
having endorsed a COMESA JFPI in 2008.106 In 
June 2009 the Alliance for Commodity Trade 
in Eastern and Southern Africa (ACTESA) was 
formally established as a specialised agency 
of COMESA. From 2010 until 2011 COMESA/
ACTESA’s Regional Agro-inputs Programme 
(COMRAP), funded by the European Union, 
focused on improving small-holder access to 
finance and agro-dealer development. A lack of 
funding put paid to any follow-up to COMRAP 
and the programme ended in 2012.107
Within SADC the focus, for the time being at 
least, appears to be on harmonised labelling 
regulations, following the recommendations 
of a study in 2009 into fertiliser production 
capacities in the region.108 This is being 
undertaken by the SADC secretariat as part of 
the much wider SADC Regional Agricultural 
Policy (RAP) process, which has also emphasised 
increasing access to finance for investments 
along the fertiliser value chain.
In West Africa the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) and the Union 
Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine 
(UEMOA) in 2010 embarked on a regional legal 
framework. As a result, ECOWAS adopted a 
regulatory framework on fertilisers at Abidjan, 
Cote D’Ivoire in December 2012, which covered 
aspects of importation, manufacturing, sale 
and quality control. The regulations also 
called for the establishment of a West African 
Committee on fertiliser control. Challenges 
and opportunities in fertiliser production in 
ECOWAS have also been explored,109 while 
the industrialisation policy of the East African 
Community (EAC) 2012–2032 has earmarked 
fertilisers as a priority area.110
Finance
Financial constraints have frequently been 
cited as a major hindrance to the increased 
consumption of fertiliser in Africa, particularly 
among small-holder farmers. Recognising this, 
the Abuja Declaration has called for a number 
of interventions at the national and regional 
level.
Most clearly articulated (Resolution 11) was 
the creation of an African Fertiliser Financing 
Mechanism (AFFM). The AFFM’s framework 
describes it as being a “key instrument in 
the implementation of NEPAD’s CAADP”, and 
identifies priority areas as:  providing financing 
for developing Africa’s manufacturing capacity 
http://www.ifdc.org/Projects/Current2/North_West_Africa/USAID_
WAFP_USAID_West_Africa_Fertilizer_Program/
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(including the funding of pre-investment and 
feasibility studies); providing credit guarantees 
for fertiliser importers and distributors; 
establishing regional fertiliser procurement 
and distribution facilities; policy work; and 
institutional, research and capacity building 
initiatives.111
The African Development Bank (AfDB), 
in collaboration with the UN Economic 
Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the African 
Union Commission (AUC), were given the 
mandate by African heads of state to establish 
and host the AFFM. Despite pledges totalling 
US$25 million from various donor organisations 
(including a US$10 million pledge by the 
government of Nigeria),112 by the time of the 
AFFM’s second governing council meeting in 
Tunis in March 2013, the AFFM still had not 
become legally operational, owing to shortfalls 
in donor support.113 From its private sector 
window, from 2011–2013 the AfDB extended 
loans to the value of US$500 million to the 
Morocco National Phosphates Company, the 
Gabon Fertiliser Company and the Indorama 
Corporation in Nigeria.114
By far the greatest mobilisation of resources to 
stimulate small-holder use of fertilisers in Sub-
Saharan Africa has been via agricultural input 
studies, about which much has been written in 
recent times. A summary of some of the latest 
findings around fertiliser subsidies follows 
immediately after profiles of some of the major 
players involved in the Green Revolution and 
fertiliser push, below.
The Alliance for a 
Green Revolution in 
Africa (AGRA) 
The Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa 
(AGRA) is a non-profit organisation established 
in 2006 by the Bill and Melinda Gates and 
Rockefeller Foundations to modernise African 
agriculture. AGRA has recognised that efforts 
to transplant the original Green Revolution to 
Africa were undermined by the heterogeneous 
nature of African farming systems, shortages 
of water and the lack of a well-resourced layer 
of peasant farmers ready to adopt inputs that 
required capital (or access to it). As such it 
presents a far more nuanced template for an 
African Green Revolution. AGRA, unlike previous 
efforts in Africa led by the World Bank, also 
does not have unilateral power to impose its 
model on African governments, but must rely 
on the power of its arguments—which are 
inordinately strengthened by its deep financial 
resources and access to the policy space.115 
That said, AGRA is nonetheless motivated 
by the assumption that traditional African 
agriculture is backward and inferior to the 
commercial-industrial model of agriculture 
practiced in the US and Europe. AGRA believes 
the remedy for this is to increase agricultural 
productivity through improvements in farming 
techniques, and the use of improved seed and 
fertilisers. But this intervention will require 
money, or access to credit, and entry into 
markets before the system can succeed.116
AGRA’s main programmes of work are arranged 
thematically—seed, soil health, market access, 
policy and advocacy, farmer organisations, 
Figure 7: AGRA soil health programme indicators
Indicator 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Total inorganic fertilisers sold 
(cumulative)
262 8,262 39,762 133,950 177,825
Volume (tons) of inorganic 
fertiliser sales by AGRA-
supported              agro-dealers 
0 8,000 31,500 94,188 43,836
Source: AGRA, 2013.
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and gender. It has made investments in at 
least 17 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa but 
has also focused on four countries with high 
agronomic potential—it refers to these as the 
‘breadbasket countries’—being Ghana, Mali, 
Mozambique and Tanzania.117 While AGRA 
does not represent the Green Revolution push 
in Africa in its entirety, it is arguably its most 
visible and vocal proponent.
AGRA’s Soil Health Programme (SHP) 
AGRA’s Soil Health Programme (SHP) was 
established with start-up funds of US$198.4 
million, of which the Gates Foundation 
provided US$182.4 million, with the balance 
coming from the Rockefeller Foundation. It was 
officially launched in August 2008. The SHP 
was expected to stimulate total investments 
of between US$2.5–US$3 billion over the first 
ten years of its lifespan, with the private sector 
expected to account for approximately 40% in 
the form of investments in fertiliser production 
capacity across the continent. Of the remainder, 
30% was expected to be provided by national 
governments through extension and fertiliser 
sector investments, with the balance coming 
from the international donor community.118
AGRA identifies nutrient depletion and 
soil erosion as two of the major factors 
undermining agricultural productivity in 
Africa over the past four decades. Its proposed 
solution for this is Integrated Soil Fertility 
Management (ISFM), or a combination of 
organic and inorganic fertilisers. Organic soil 
fertility methods cited by AGRA in its latest 
report include the use of animal manure, 
agro-forestry and crop rotation, and no or 
minimum tillage, two of the key components 
of Conservation Agriculture (CA). However, 
these are seen as complementary to, rather 
than alternatives for, the use of inorganic 
fertiliser, and big increases in overall fertiliser 
consumption were included as programme 
indicators from the outset. Two of these are 
shown in the table below. 119
After a slow start it appears that some progress 
has been made, although these indicators 
give little sense of who is actually buying this 
fertiliser, what kinds of fertiliser are being sold , 
or the costs to farmers. Under its SHP AGRA has 
also undertaken to train extension staff and 
‘lead farmers‘ in ISFM techniques. According to 
the AGRA 2013 annual report, by the end of 2013 
more than 4,000 extension staff and 138,000 
lead farmers had been trained. As above, the 
numbers give little sense of the practical 
outcomes of this training.
By the end of 2013 the SHP had invested about 
US$68 million, of which US$37.5 million (55%) 
had been spent on increasing fertiliser supply 
in twelve of AGRA’s focus countries. The largest 
single grant awarded by AGRA120 has been its 
US$25 million contribution towards the African 
Fertiliser Agribusiness Partnership (AFAP), 
which involves AGRA, NEPAD, the African 
Development Bank (AfDB), the IFDC, and 
the Agricultural Markets Development Trust 
(AGMARK).121
AFAP is based in Johannesburg, South Africa, 
but its operational focus (for the time being at 
least) is in Ghana, Mozambique and Tanzania 
(three of AGRA’s breadbasket countries). AFAP’s 
two main goals are to increase the number 
of fertiliser users by 15% and at least double 
the figures for total fertiliser use; this implies 
a smaller number of commercial farmers 
using fertilisers, and other inputs, much more 
intensively. AFAP’s modus operandi is through 
an Agribusiness Partnership Contract (APC) 
between an agribusiness and AFAP; essentially, 
this is a public-private sector partnership in the 
form of credit guarantees and matching grant 
funding. According to AGRA’s latest annual 
report, by the end of 2013 AFAP had approved 
18 such APCs, including US$4.3 million in credit 
guarantees.
AGRA has also partnered with Standard Bank 
of South Africa to develop credit guarantee 
schemes. In 2009 AGRA awarded Standard 
Bank of South Africa US$5 million to provide 
access to credit facilities by small-holder 
farmers, agro-dealers and “other players in 
the small holder value chain” in Tanzania, 
Uganda, Mozambique and Ghana.122 So far, 
over US$150 million has been leveraged in the 
form of low interest loans to small-holders and 
agribusinesses in Kenya and Ghana.123
In 2008 AGRA established the African 
Enterprise Challenge Fund (AECF) to promote 
private sector investments along the 
agricultural value chain.124 Though the AECF 
has its own charter, it is not a registered legal 
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entity and, as such, ultimate responsibility for 
the performance of AECF rests with the board 
of AGRA. AECF has made two investments 
in fertiliser production in West Africa; a 
US$750,000 grant to Toguna Agro industries, 
based in Mali, for the production of pelletised 
phosphate fertilisers,125 and an unspecified 
sum to Notore chemicals of Nigeria, to produce 
and commercialise urea-super-granules in 
the country.126 AECF also contributed US$1.25 
million to the establishment of Yara’s Ghana 
grains partnership, a private-public partnership 
in Ghana’s maize value chain. See below.
International 
Fertiliser 
Development Centre 
(IFDC) 
The International Fertiliser Development 
Centre (IFDC) is a non-profit organisation that 
engages in a wide range of activities concerned 
with the promotion of fertilisers, from policy 
work and capacity building to implementing 
input voucher schemes and supporting agro 
dealer development. It has had a presence 
in Africa since 1987 when it opened its Africa 
division office in Lome, Togo. Its presence in 
Africa (31 countries in total) is divided between 
its East and Southern Africa Division (ESAFD) 
and North and West Africa Divisions (NWAFD).
Its donors include all the major fertiliser 
industry bodies, including the International 
Fertiliser Industry Association (IFA), the 
International Plant Nutrition Institute (IPNI), 
the Sulphur Institute (TSI) and the International 
Potash Institute (IPI). From 2009 to 2011 the 
IFDC received over US$16.6 million in grants 
from AGRA.127
The IFDC strategic plan for 2012–2015 identifies 
two paramount objectives: disseminating new 
technologies and practices to small-holder 
farmers, and strengthening input and output 
markets for small-holder farmers. These will 
be carried out under its strategic intervention 
areas, being:
1. The development of more efficient fertiliser 
products (including those derived from 
advances in nano-technology and molecular 
biology); 
2. training and capacity building to actors 
along the value chain;
3. improving the efficiency of input markets;
4. capacity building of farmers to shift from 
subsistence to commercial production;
5. strengthening output markets; and
6. analysing, informing and influencing policy 
reform.
The close ties between the IFDC, AGRA, USAID 
and other donor organisations are evident in 
the projects in which it is currently involved. 
Under its East and Southern Africa Division 
(ESAFD) the IFDC is working with AGRA on 
the African Soil Health Consortium (ASHC), 
in addition to agro-dealer development in 
Ethiopia, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Sudan 
and Rwanda. With the Netherlands Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs it is doing similar work in 
Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Rwanda and Uganda. It is providing guidance 
and support for the creation of a national 
fertiliser subsidy programme in Burundi, and 
leading the privatisation of Rwanda’s fertiliser 
import and distribution system.128
The IFDC is equally active in North and 
West Africa, where it is also working closely 
http://www.ifdc.org/About/IFDC_Articles/Improving-Fertilizer-Mar-
kets-Through-Voucher-Progr/ 
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with AGRA on value chain and agro-dealer 
development in Ghana and Burkina Faso, 
improving access to inputs in Mali, Niger and 
Togo and cassava value chain development 
in Ghana and Nigeria. In addition, with FARA, 
it is working on innovation platforms in rice, 
vegetables, livestock and maize-legume 
production systems in Nigeria. In Burkina Faso, 
Mali, Nigeria and Togo the IFDC is working with 
the International Fertiliser Industry Association 
(IFA) to improve access to inputs.
Several projects in the region have been 
conducted with USAID, including the 
development of cassava value chains in Liberia, 
a cotton improvement programme in Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Senegal, and the 
USAID West Africa Fertiliser programme (see 
below). The IFDC has also facilitated a public-
private partnership between Notore Chemical 
Industries, the only manufacturer of nitrogen 
fertilisers in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the 
Nigerian national programme for food security, 
for the supply of urea briquettes.
The IFDC also provided training to nearly 
690,000 agribusiness stakeholders across its 
two operational areas in 2013 (333,532 in ESAFD 
and 321,138 in NWAFD). This is to be compared 
with the 142,000 lead farmers and extension 
staff who received training in ISFM from AGRA 
between 2008 and the end of 2013.
The IFDC has also established two online 
fertiliser information portals, Africafertiliser.
org and AMITSA, the Regional Agricultural 
Input Market Information and Transparency 
System. The Africafertiliser.org initiative was 
launched in 2010 as a web-based portal for 
the free distribution of fertiliser statistics (e.g. 
production, trade, consumption) and to provide 
information on fertiliser policy, regulation, 
and industry. It works in partnership with the 
International Fertiliser Association (IFA), the 
African Fertiliser and Agribusiness Partnership 
(AFAP), the UN FAO , the African Union 
Commission (AUC) and NEPAD.129
AMITSA was established by the IFDC for the 
2009–2010 season to serve as a regional 
information service for COMESA and the 
EAC; its stated objectives were to improve 
access to data on agricultural input markets, 
establish business linkages in the value chain, 
reduce procurement costs, increase the use of 
input costs, and increase overall agricultural 
productivity. AMITSA has partnerships with 
AGRA and several other projects being run 
by the IFDC, regional programmes being 
implemented by COMESA and the EAC, and 
a number of trade associations including 
CropLife (which represents the interests of 
global biotechnology and agro-chemical 
companies), the International Fertiliser 
Association (IFA) and the African Seed Trade 
Association (AFSTA).130
Figure 8: IFDC increased fertiliser consumption estimates
Country Policy Target 
year
Est. Current 
consumption 
(MT per year)
Est. Required 
consumption
(MT per year)
Increase factor 
(%)
Ethiopia 2015 550,000 1,200,000 2.2
Ghana 2015 200,000 520,000 2.6
Kenya 2015 488,803 910,000 1.9
Mozambique 2020 51,600 312,000 6.0
Tanzania 2015 263,000 528,000 2.0
Malawi 2016 297,000 600,000 2.0
Zambia 2015 250,000 498,000 2.0
Source: Wanzala & Groot, 2013; IFDC, 2013.
30   A F R I C A N  C E N T R E  F O R  B I O S A F E T Y
United States 
Agency for 
International 
Development 
(USAID) 
While not as prominent as other donor 
organisations on the fertiliser issue, USAID 
has nevertheless been highly influential, being 
one of the sponsors of the African fertiliser 
summit in Abuja, Nigeria, in 2006. More 
recently, USAID has provided US$20 million 
to fund the West African Fertiliser Project 
(WAFP) from 2012–2017. WAFP’s main goals 
are to increase regulatory harmonisation in 
respect of fertilisers among ECOWAS member 
states, to increase yields by 65% in target areas 
(Ghana, Liberia, Mali and Senegal) through the 
increased adoption of ISFM and Fertiliser Deep 
placement, give technical assistance to 1,600 
agro-dealers to reach 30,000 new farmers, 
realise a 10% increase in the volume of fertiliser 
sold in WAFP focus countries, and to provide 
regular fertiliser market information updates 
to 2,200 fertiliser supply chain actors.131
USAID has also commissioned and funded, 
under the Feed the Future Initiative, studies 
into the fertiliser value chains of twelve 
African countries, together with estimates 
for increased consumption and policy 
recommendations to realise this. AFAP is 
expected to be the chief beneficiary of these 
studies. Seven of these studies, in eastern and 
southern Africa, were focused on increasing 
fertiliser use and policy options towards this 
(see Table below), while five of the  studies, 
in West Africa (Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, 
Senegal and Togo), were focused on the 
quality of fertiliser traded in these countries, 
to support the regional fertiliser policy 
implemented by ECOWAS.132
All the reports above cite infrastructure as a 
major constraint to achieving these stated 
increases in consumption. Many of Africa’s 
ports are operating significantly above capacity 
and delays are common. At Mombasa port 
it can take up to 30 days for the contents 
of a 20,000 MT bulk cargo ship to clear 
through port. Once through port, 95% of 
cargo in Kenya is transported by road.133 The 
situation is not much different in Tanzania. 
For landlocked countries these problems are 
further exacerbated. In Malawi, for example, 
there is currently no direct rail link between 
Lilongwe and Dar es Salaam, or Beira in 
Mozambique. The rail link between Nacala port 
in Mozambique, which can handle vessels of up 
to 30,000 MT, is poorly equipped to handle bulk 
fertiliser shipments.134
As such, the bulk of this increase in fertiliser 
cargo is likely to be transported by road, the 
implications of which could be far reaching. In 
the case of Tanzania, it was estimated that a 
doubling of fertiliser consumption would result 
in an additional 25,000 trucks on the roads 
annually.135 In Ethiopia, current contractual 
arrangements between the Agricultural Input 
Supplies Enterprise (AISE) and its suppliers 
require a fertiliser discharge rate of 2,000 MT 
per day, which requires 50–65 trucks per day. 
The average distance between the port at 
Djibouti and the AISE warehouses is 860km.136 
A doubling of fertiliser consumption implies a 
doubling of trucking volumes.
The G8 New Alliance 
and Grow Africa 
The G8 New Alliance on food security and 
Grow Africa both emerged from the WEF’s 
2010 meeting in Davos, Switzerland, where 
seventeen companies presented the Roadmap 
for Stakeholders, describing a new vision 
for agriculture in Africa. One year later, 
again at the WEF in Davos, Grow Africa was 
launched with sponsorship from the WEF, 
the African Union Commission and NEPAD, 
for whose Comprehensive Africa Agricultural 
Development Programme (CAADP) it declared 
its support. Explicit overtures to CAADP have 
enabled companies operating under Grow 
Africa to claim the process as an ‘African owned 
process’.137 
Grow Africa (and the multinational 
corporations it represented) were instrumental 
in the establishment of the G8 New Alliance on 
Food Security and Nutrition at the G8 Summit 
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hosted by the United States at Camp David in 
May 2012. Fertilisers feature prominently in the 
G8 country co-operation frameworks, in which 
New Alliance countries must pledge to make 
the necessary policy and legal changes in order 
to facilitate the entry of the private sector into 
national fertiliser markets.138
Under Grow Africa, where companies sign 
‘letters of intent’ with host governments, 
Yara has been the most active private sector 
participant, having signed letters of intent 
with the governments of Burkina Faso, Ghana 
and Tanzania. (See section on Yara below.) 
Elsewhere, in Mozambique, Indian agribusiness 
firm United Phosphorus (now known as UPL 
Limited) has signed a letter of intent to work 
with small-scale farmers on maize, sorghum, 
sunflower, canola, rice, cotton, forages, legumes 
and vegetables through on-farm training 
schools.139
Yara 
Yara is the largest producer of ammonia, 
nitrates and complex NPK fertilisers in the 
world, and is responsible for 20% of the global 
trade in ammonia. It is also the world’s third 
biggest buyer of phosphorus and potash. 
In 2012 it was the second largest fertiliser 
company in the world by revenue (the US$15 
billion it made in 2012 was surpassed only 
by the US$16.5 billion made by US fertiliser 
firm Agrium). Yara profited handsomely when 
fertiliser prices went through the roof in 2007 
and 2008; between 2009 and 2012 its profits 
increased from US$612 million to US$1,823 
million, representing a  197% increase. Of all 
of the world’s major fertiliser companies, Yara 
historically has been, and continues to be, the 
most active on the African continent.
The company’s origins can be traced back 
to that of Norwegian industrial firm Norsk-
Hyrdo which, in December 1905, (less than 
two months after Norwegian independence) 
produced the world’s first nitrogen fertiliser, 
using the country’s substantial hydro-electric 
power reserves to extract nitrogen from the air. 
By the time Yara was unbundled from Norsk-
Hydro and listed on the Oslo stock exchange 
in 2004 it had a presence on every continent. 
The Norwegian state remains the largest single 
shareholder in Yara, with 36.2% of total shares 
available.
According to its 2013 financial report, Yara sells 
fertiliser in more than 150 countries world-
wide, maintains a direct presence in more than 
50 countries and has manufacturing facilities 
in fifteen. Thanks in part to its acquisition of 
Bunge’s Brazilian fertiliser operations, Yara 
is now the largest supplier of fertilisers in a 
Brazilian market that accounts for 6% of global 
Figure 9: Fertiliser related reforms under the G8 New Alliance on food security and nutrition
G8 New Alliance country Fertiliser related commitments in country’s G8 co-operation 
frameworks
Burkina Faso Facilitate private sector participation in fertiliser supply contracts, 
establish targeting mechanisms for input subsidies
Ghana New agricultural input policy for fertiliser and certified seed (to 
include a clearly defined role for the government of Ghana in 
fertiliser and seed marketing)
Malawi Fast track development of the fertiliser regulatory framework
Mozambique Develop and implement a national fertiliser regulatory enforcement 
framework; assess and validate national fertiliser strategy
Nigeria Develop institutional capacity for fertiliser (and seed) certification; 
improve transparency and private sector participation in fertiliser 
distribution systems
Source: DfID, 2014.
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fertiliser use. It has major production facilities, 
either individually or in partnerships, across 
Europe, in Australia, Brazil, Canada, Columbia, 
Libya, Qatar, South Africa and Trinidad, and is 
currently in discussion with chemical giant 
BASF to construct a world-scale ammonia plant 
on the US Gulf coast.
Yara’s business interests in Africa stretch back 
to 1929, when Norsk-Hydro began shipping 
fertilisers to Egypt. These deliveries continued, 
bar the duration of the Second World War, until 
the nationalisation of key Egyptian industries 
in 1950. After a lengthy hiatus, deliveries to 
Egypt resumed in the early 1980s, by which 
time Yara’s African operations had expanded 
through the acquisition of Dutch company 
NSM in 1979, followed by Fisons (British) 
and Cofaz (French). NSM had an established 
fertiliser network in Kenya, Tanzania and 
Zambia, while Fisons and Cofaz had chemical 
enterprises in Zimbabwe. In 1985 Yara, with 
one eye firmly on South Africa’s huge yet 
isolated market, opened a southern African 
sales office in Zimbabwe and an African office 
at its headquarters in Oslo. The Oslo office 
moved to Paris and then finally re-located to 
Johannesburg in 1996.
Although Yara is not directly involved in 
phosphate extraction or production in Africa, 
it was recently revealed that it has bought 
phosphate from Western Sahara even though 
such purchases have been banned by the 
Norwegian Government.  Morocco, which 
controls more than 50% of the phosphate 
reserves in the world, also controls large 
phosphate reserves in the occupied territories 
in Western Sahara.140
In 2005 Yara shifted its African focus from 
retail to manufacture and the wholesale 
trade of fertilisers, although it retained links 
to retail in some countries. For example, in 
Malawi, Yara’s retail operations were subject 
to a management buy-out which resulted in 
the establishment of Agricultural Resources 
Limited. The new firm was granted exclusive 
rights to sell Yara Fertilisers in Malawi.141 Before 
the fertiliser programme was implemented in 
Malawi, Yara had been supplying up to 60% 
of the domestic fertiliser market. Yara still 
maintains significant commercial interests on 
the continent through tendering to many of 
the fertiliser subsidy programmes currently 
underway, for example in Ethiopia, Ghana and 
Mali.142
Also in 2005, to celebrate its centenary, Yara 
established the Yara Foundation and started 
awarding the Yara Prize for a Green Revolution 
in Africa. The first award went, controversially, 
to Ethiopian president Meles Zenawi. In 
January 2006 it was revealed that Yara 
International had won major fertiliser contracts 
worth 12 million Euros just three months after 
Zenawi received his Yara prize.143 From the 
outset the Yara Foundation had strong links 
to Columbia University’s Earth Institute, one 
of the key drivers behind the UN Millenium 
project and Millenium villages. Yara is 
supplying two of these villages with fertiliser.144 
Yara classifies its early involvement in the 
Green Revolution push as its ‘Corporate Social 
Responsibility’ (CSR) phase and has since been 
seeking to scale up its presence through the 
development and promotion of its agricultural 
Growth Corridors approach (see below), first 
at the UN and then through the WEF. With the 
groundwork and political buy-in now in place, 
and its involvement in the G8 New Alliance 
for Food Security and Nutrition and ‘Grow 
Africa’, Yara has positioned itself firmly in the 
vanguard of the modernisation drive.
Yara has played a key role in establishing 
Grow Africa, together with the African 
Union Commission (AUC), NEPAD and the 
WEF. Grow Africa describes itself as a public-
private platform “to galvanise greater private 
sector investment and financing for African 
http://thehaberboschprocess.files.wordpress.com/2011/08/dianchi-
lake_china_blue-green-algae-bloom.jpg 
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agriculture, in support of the Comprehensive 
Africa Agriculture Development Programme 
(CAADP)”.145 Thanks to Grow Africa, Yara has 
already signed letters of intent with the 
governments of Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana 
and Tanzania.
In 2008 Yara spearheaded the creation of the 
Ghana Grains Partnership, a private-public 
partnership encompassing ten organisations 
across the maize value chain in Ghana. 
Following a pilot phase, in which 1,250 farmers 
planted 4,000 ha of maize in July 2008, the 
partnership was awarded a grant of US$1.25 
million by the African Enterprise Challenge 
Fund (AECF).146 By 2013 the project had been 
scaled-up to service over 8,000 farmers.147
In Burkina Faso, Yara has been developing a 
national fertiliser markets strategy, taking a 
value chain approach. In Ghana, Yara plans to 
invest up to US$2 billion to develop a fertiliser 
production facility and to work with the 
government to develop “a national strategy 
for holistic, in-country fertiliser market 
development”.  A US$22 million development 
of a revolving fertiliser terminal at the port of 
Tema has been mooted, though uncertainty 
around the national fertiliser subsidy 
programme is delaying this venture.
In Tanzania, the Southern Agricultural Growth 
Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) is the major 
thrust of the Green Revolution push in the 
country. Again, Yara was instrumental in the 
establishment of SAGCOT, presenting the 
idea to the UN in 2008 and then the WEF 
in Davos in in 2009 and 2010. As part of its 
involvement with SAGCOT, Yara has undertaken 
the construction of a US$20 million fertiliser 
terminal at the port of Dar es Salaam, which 
is expected to be completed by late 2014. A 
survey conducted by the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in 2012 found a 
great deal of discord among Yara’s competitors 
in Tanzania regarding the level of support given 
to Yara by the Tanzanian government; many 
claimed they would not have received the same 
levels of support.148 
Yara clearly anticipates growing markets on 
the continent in the foreseeable future and has 
been investing accordingly. In 2013 it increased 
its stake to 51% in Ethiopotash, a project to 
develop potash resources in Ethiopia’s Danakil 
Depression. In the same year Yara announced it 
was investigating the feasibility of constructing 
a regional fertiliser plant in the gas-rich 
Mtwara region of Tanzania.149
Agronomic constraints to fertiliser 
adoption in Africa 
Environmental issues around overuse 
of synthetic fertilisers are well known, 
from soil acidification to the presence 
of algal blooms due to excess nitrogen 
run-off. Further, in areas where fertiliser 
use has been high, fertiliser application is 
becoming more inefficient. For example, 
nutrient use efficiency for phosphorus (P) 
is a low 12–20%. Only around 4–15% of P 
consumed by livestock becomes available 
for human consumption.150 The European 
Nitrogen Assessment found that livestock 
consumed 85% of N used in crop and grass 
production.151
Not accounting for plant-specific differences, 
the average ratio of main ingredients 
required by plants is 1 N to 0.44 P to 1.25 
K. Therefore, nitrogen should account for 
roughly 37% of applied macro-nutrients. 
However, over the last 50 years nitrogen 
use has risen disproportionately against 
phosphorus and potassium; from less than 
50% in 1961 to 74% in 2009. In China and 
Tanzania nitrogen levels were as high as 80% 
and 94% respectively.152
Soil acidification (which inhibits nutrient 
uptake) is a global problem, but is of special 
significance in the humid tropics, where 
severe weathering and leaching have made 
a large proportion of tropical soils very 
acidic. It takes approximately 0.71kg of lime 
to neutralise the acidifying effects of 1kg 
of urea, but systematic liming is expensive 
and rarely practiced in small-holder 
agriculture.153 The Brazilian Cerrado region, 
heralded as a modern agricultural success 
story to be replicated in parts of Africa, has 
naturally highly acidic soils. These required 
liming for many years before farmers could 
productively utilise these lands and achieve 
a profitable response to the application of 
fertiliser.154
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In Africa soils vary considerably, even at 
the farm level. The soil fertility status 
of individual fields may differ as much 
as differences between different agro-
ecological zones.155 Finally, the lack of 
infrastructure is likely to undermine many 
of the expected impacts of increased 
fertiliser use. Water has been described as 
the game-changer in fertiliser use. Forty-
five per cent of South Asia’s grain crops are 
under irrigation, which typically affords two 
to three cropping seasons per year with a 
relatively stable yield response to fertiliser. 
Estimates suggest that even in the next 50 
years only 11% of African farmland will be 
under irrigation.156
Fertiliser subsidies 
in Sub-Saharan 
Africa
After a period of being out of favour, the 
resurgence of ISPs in Africa has ‘arguably 
been the region’s most important agricultural 
policy development in recent years.’ In 2011 ten 
African countries spent approximately US$1.05 
billion on ISPs, amounting to 28.6% of their 
public expenditure on agriculture (see tables 
below).157 Approximately 40% of the fertiliser 
consumed in Sub-Saharan Africa is subsidised 
to varying degrees.158 
FISPs were a cornerstone of agricultural policy 
in many countries of Sub-Saharan Africa post-
independence. In keeping with the spirit of 
the age, the international donor community 
was largely supportive of universal subsidies 
during the 1960s and 1970s. The imposition 
of structural adjustment policies on African 
nations during the 1980s forced most African 
governments, with the notable exceptions of 
Malawi and Zambia, to curtail input subsidies; 
the assumption being that the private sector 
would step into the breach.
Attitudes gradually softened during the 
1990s as donor priorities shifted from rigid 
conditionality in the agricultural sector to 
general budgetary support, giving African 
governments some degree of flexibility.159 
Fertiliser subsidies gained further traction 
at the continental level following the Abuja 
Declaration of 2006, which called for targeted 
subsidies “with special attention to poor 
farmers”, a call that was supported by the 
World Bank (historically a strong opponent of 
FISPs) from around 2007. According to Jayne 
et al, in addition to these factors, debt relief 
under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) initiative, higher world food prices after 
2008, and the continued maturation of African 
democracies (where political leaders have 
discovered the popularity of ISPs among their 
constituents) have also contributed.160
Measuring 
the impacts of 
Input Subsidy 
Programmes (ISPs) 
The case of Malawi has, perhaps more 
than any other country, highlighted the 
complexities of the design, implementation 
and analysis of input subsidies, and has 
elicited a steady stream of academic enquiry 
(see below). In a literature review of recent 
ISPs in Africa, Agricultural Input Subsidies: 
The Recent Malawi Experience, Chriwa and 
Dorward (2013) frame their analysis in 
terms of programme objectives, design and 
implementation, and programme outcomes. 
In addition to Malawi, country programmes 
covered in their analysis were: Ghana, 
Zambia, Nigeria, Tanzania, Rwanda, Mali and 
Senegal.
Objectives
A programme’s objectives should act as a 
guide to later implementation. For example, 
is the objective of the ISP focused on simply 
increasing aggregate food production 
(specifically staple grain), increasing input 
adoption, or increasing the welfare of 
small-scale farmers? According to Chriwa 
and Dorward, nearly all the programmes 
analysed held these as central objectives, 
while only three programmes explicitly 
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Figure 11: Targeted input subsidy costs in Sub-Saharan Africa
Country Year Official 
cost 
(million 
US$)
Author’s 
Calculated 
cost 
(million 
US$)
ISP cost 
per MT of 
fertiliser 
distributed    
(US$/MT)
Public 
expenditure 
on agriculture 
(million US$)
ISP as % 
of public 
agricultural 
spending 
Kenya 2009
2010
2011
NA
NA
NA
80.9
21.6
62.1
696
911
1072
194
262
318
22.2
9.1
25.7
Malawi 2009
2010
2011
275
115
127
184.2
152
179.2
1000
1070
1200
258
323
308
71.3
47.1
58.3
Tanzania 2009 
2010 
2011
92 
114 
94
96.4 
135 
134.1
683 
894 
1056
250 
252 
291
38.5 
53.5 
46
Zambia 2009 
2010 
2011
119 
101 
109
104.9 
99.8 
134.8
935 
971  
1310 
214 
270 
438
21 
26.9 
39.9
Ethiopia* 2009 
2010 
2011
NA 
NA 
NA
49 
43 
55
132 
117 
130
410 
483 
530
12 
8.9 
10.4
Source: Jayne & Rashid, 2013.
* The Ethiopian government does not refer to its subsidisation of retail fertiliser prices as a subsidy programme.
Figure 10: Non-targeted input subsidy programme costs in Sub-Saharan Africa
Country Year Cost US$ 
Million
ISP cost per 
MT of fertiliser 
distributed 
(US$/MT)
Public 
expenditure 
on agriculture 
(million US$)
ISP as % 
of public 
agricultural 
spending 
Mali 2009
2010
2011
15.5
10.5
38.6
878
873
890
159
177
213
9.7
5.9
18.1
Burkina Faso 2008
2009
2010
14.4
27.3
21.7
947
938
867
158
189
259
9.1
14.4
8.4
Ghana 2009
2010
2011
52.5
55.5
111.7
719
631
634
275
279
374
19.1
19.9
29.9
Senegal 2008 
2009 
2010
42.4 
36 
42.4
731 
720 
785
137 
136 
163
30.9 
26.9 
26.1
Nigeria 2008 
2009 
2010
159 
108 
190
625 
648 
719
662 
677 
729
24.1 
16 
26
Source: Jayne & Rashid, 2013.
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recognised the potential of ISPs to benefit 
consumers. Although increased access 
to inputs and the development of input 
supply systems were key objectives in all 
ISPs observed, except Mali and Senegal, only 
Tanzania recognised (in its ISP objectives) the 
importance of input use efficiency and soil 
fertility management.161
Another recent review of ISPs in Sub-Saharan 
Africa argued that the poorest should be 
targeted if the programme aims to increase 
their productivity and incomes, but those 
with higher growing potential should be 
targeted if an increase in aggregate output 
is the desired outcome.162 This follows the 
Green Revolution logic where a select class 
of farmers, better able to adopt costly 
inputs, should be the focus of agricultural 
development.
Design and implementation 
How the objectives are framed is likely to 
influence the design and implementation 
of such ISPs; hence, a narrow food security 
objective, as was found to be common 
across many ISPs in Africa, may stimulate 
the increased production of staple grains 
(particularly maize) by small-holders 
(although this is not guaranteed) and thus 
shift resources from other crops. Most of 
the ISPs observed attempted some form of 
rationing, with vouchers being the most 
common method, and supported substantial 
input price reductions (50% or more of the 
cost of inputs in most cases).
Results 
In most cases the rationale behind targeted 
(or ‘smart’) subsidies is to correct some form 
of market failure; farmers, particularly small-
scale farmers, lack the requisite knowledge 
or access to credit to benefit from fertilisers, 
for example. Unfortunately, in societies where 
resources are scarce, the provision of ISPs has 
provided ample scope for rent seeking, which 
has disproportionately benefitted the better 
off. In Zambia, farms in the 10–20ha category 
received, on average, seven times more fertiliser 
than farms below 2ha. Similar experiences of 
elite capture have been reported in Malawi, 
despite specific targets for poor and female-
headed households. In the Kilimanjaro region 
of Tanzania, local political elites and wealthy 
households benefited disproportionately from 
a decentralised targeting system.163
In Tanzania, which introduced a national 
agricultural input voucher scheme in 2009, 
up to two million beneficiaries were targeted 
by the 2009–2010 season. Though there was 
generally a high level of awareness around the 
scheme (as reported by 93% of a household 
survey), awareness of specific eligibility criteria 
was much lower; only 28% of farmers asked 
were fully cognisant of the three-year time 
frame.164
A key determinant of the success or otherwise 
of ISPs is the responsiveness of crops to the 
fertiliser that is being provided. What little 
information is available reveals relatively 
low levels of crop response and marginal or 
even negatives levels of profitability. This is 
exacerbated by uneven expenditures on crop 
and soil science compared with subsidised 
inputs. In Malawi and Zambia the former 
presently account for less than 15% of total 
annual expenditures on agriculture, compared 
to total agricultural expenditure on subsidies 
of 40–70% and 70–90% respectively.165
A fundamental game changer in this regard is 
water, chiefly irrigation. Around 45% of South 
Asia’s grain crops are under irrigation, typically 
allowing for two to three cropping seasons 
per year and relatively stable yields. Fertiliser 
application rates for rain fed agriculture 
in India are not much more than those in 
Africa, the major difference being that 96% 
of Sub-Saharan Africa’s cultivated land is rain 
fed. Estimates suggest irrigation could rise 
to 11% over the next 50 years, which is still 
substantially below levels found in Asia and 
Latin America.166
A common objective of many ISPs launched 
in Sub-Saharan Africa is to increase overall 
access to and the use of fertilisers, and to aid 
the development of commercial distribution 
systems. Leakage (e.g. fertiliser intended for 
poorer farmers is sold in commercial markets, 
and in some cases even across borders) is 
a commonly reported problem. It has been 
reported that between 30% and 40% of 
the fertiliser procured by the governments 
of Malawi and Zambia was diverted into 
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commercial markets. High leakage rates have 
also been reported in Nigeria, where over 50% 
of the fertiliser intended for subsidised users 
was leaked into commercial markets in 2008.167
Aside from the initial procurement and 
distribution costs, the cost of carry over stock 
is an additional risk. In Ethiopia where in 2008 
the government granted a monopoly over 
fertiliser imports to the Agricultural Input 
Supplies Enterprise (AISE), a government 
agency, carry over stocks have averaged 
226,000 MT per year (up from 96,000 MT in 
2002). The cost of this carry over stock has 
averaged US$14 million per year over this 
period which, when added to average annual 
costs of US$40 million for the programme 
itself, is a significant drain on fiscal resources.168 
In addition to the fiscal costs on government, 
this can overestimate the impact ISPs have on 
overall national fertiliser use. The impact of 
leakage in Malawi, Zambia and Kenya over-
estimated the impact of ISPs on fertiliser use by 
67.3%, 61.6% and 138% respectively.169 
Impacts on commercial distribution systems 
have been mixed, reflecting a range of opinions 
from those who hold that the implementation 
of ISPs crowds out private dealers, to those 
who argue that ISPs stimulate the expansion 
of private enterprise. The latter situation was 
found in Nigeria and Kenya, while in Zambia 
many firms have been declared insolvent as a 
result of ISPs.
Exit strategies and graduation 
The burden placed by fertiliser subsidies on 
national budgets is enormous, with much 
of the cost reliant on international fertiliser 
prices and thus beyond the control of national 
governments. As such, it has been argued that 
governments should not be in the fertiliser 
distribution business for the long haul and 
that public interventions designed to promote 
increased use of fertiliser should be designed 
with a clear exit strategy.170 
Much of the recent literature speaks of 
beneficiaries ‘graduating’ from a reliance 
on subsidised inputs into more productive 
activities. Chriwa and Dorward define 
graduation as “the removal of access to a 
transfer programme that does not leave 
current beneficiaries supported by the 
programme unable to pursue sustainable 
independent livelihoods”. This will require 
some degree of measurement indicators, such 
as increases in working capital of beneficiary 
households, substitution rates of cheaper 
inputs (e.g. the replacement of fertilisers by 
organic sources or crop rotation with nitrogen 
fixing legumes).
This assumes that the subsidy made a 
sufficient difference in the first place: in 
Malawi a major concern over the universal 
subsidy scheme (pre the current targeted 
programme) was that it was too small to 
make a difference sufficient for graduation. 
In the case of measuring increases in working 
capital (or farm assets) of beneficiaries, it has 
been argued that this will depend to a large 
degree upon a farmer’s existing (pre-subsidy) 
asset levels. Again, this opens up fundamental 
questions about the role of input subsidies and 
the wider issue of access—who will benefit 
from increased access to expensive inputs?—a 
core idea of the Green Revolution push in 
Africa.
Three broad approaches may be followed in 
implementing exit strategies: (1) a reduction 
in subsidy per household; (2) a reduction in 
the number of areas or districts served by the 
programme with a phased withdrawal of the 
programme from particular areas or districts; 
and (3) the withdrawal of the programme from 
particular households. The targeted withdrawal 
of options (2) and (3) require criteria for 
determining graduation or termination and 
should be closely linked to targeting criteria 
and systems. These decisions will be highly 
political in nature and are likely to be highly 
influenced by existing power relations within 
the country, whether they are based upon 
geographical, political, ethnic or religious lines 
(or a combination of all).
http://www.ifdc.org/Projects/Recent2/East_Southern_Africa_Division/
NEPAD-FAO_Fertilizer_Subsidy_Study/
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As a consequence, exit strategies have, so 
far, proved notoriously difficult to manage. 
In their review of FISPs in Africa, Chirwa and 
Doward could find evidence of exit strategies 
or graduation only in Tanzania and Zambia, 
and commented that “there appear to be 
difficulties in implementing this”. When 
questioned about a potential exit strategy in 
Malawi, the president at the time, Bingu wa 
Mutharika, publically stated that he had “never 
heard anywhere in the world about exiting 
from eating.”171
Malawi 
Few subsidy programmes in Africa have 
garnered such international coverage or 
praise as Malawi’s Agricultural Input Supply 
Programme (ASIP—later FISP), implemented 
in 2005 in the face of strong donor opposition. 
It has been widely reported that, with FISP, 
Malawi’s maize harvest virtually doubled 
over the course of a growing season, and the 
country became a net exporter of maize to 
the region. The international development 
aristocracy, including the World Bank172 and 
the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa 
(AGRA), have invoked Malawi’s experience as 
an example to be followed by other African 
nations. The term ‘miracle’ became almost 
obligatory when reporting on the subject. 
Fortunately, this wave of media coverage has 
been followed by a more nuanced critique 
from academia, including Malawian scholars 
themselves, which has added a broader 
perspective to the issue.
As with other countries in Sub Saharan Africa, 
Malawi had a long history of input support 
post-independence, which provided fertiliser 
price subsidies from the 1960s to the 1980s. 
During this period the parastatal marketing 
board, the Agricultural Development & 
Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) was the 
sole supplier of inputs and the sole purchaser 
of outputs.173 This system was dismantled 
following the imposition of structural 
adjustment policies (SAPs) in the 1980s 
(Malawi was the first country in the Southern 
Figure 12: Malawi’s fertiliser distribution using FISP, 2005–2006 to 2011–2012, metric tons (MT)
Source: adapted from Chirwa and Dorward, 2013.
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African Development Community to adopt 
these, in 1981.174)
In 1993, in response to currency devaluation, 
the removal of fertiliser subsidies and the 
collapse of the maize input credit system, 
the government introduced large scale 
distribution of free inputs across the country. 
This developed into the universal Starter Pack 
programme, implemented in 1998 with funding 
from the UK Department for International 
Development (DfID). The Starter Pack provided 
every small-holder with enough maize seed 
and fertiliser for 0.1 ha of land. Combined with 
favourable weather conditions, the Starter Pack 
resulted in an estimated 67% increase in maize 
production, pushing the national harvest up to 
2.5 million tons.
However, by 1999 the programme was 
already proving highly contentious. Originally 
conceived as a broad agricultural development 
programme, the Starter Pack, launched just 
before the 1999 elections, soon descended into 
a highly politicised, short-term political vehicle. 
Amid wide-spread concerns over corruption 
and rent seeking, particularly from donors, the 
programme was scaled down. 
For the next two seasons (2000–2001 and 
2001–2002) Malawi was hit by poor harvests, 
high food prices and food shortages, making 
fertiliser subsidies a major campaigning 
platform in the 2004 elections for both the 
United Democratic Front (UDF) and the 
Malawi Congress Party (MCP). Its newly elected 
president, Bingu wa Mutharika of the UDF, 
was initially reluctant to implement a new 
fertiliser programme due to donor pressure. In 
early 2005, seeking to distance himself from 
former President Muluzi, President Mutharika 
broke away from the ruling UDF to form the 
new Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). With 
no representation in Parliament, President 
Mutharika was now dependent upon the 
support of the MCP, who had continued to 
lobby for universal subsidies, and acquiesced 
to their wishes.175 Mutharika also saw an 
opportunity to recompense his lack of support 
in parliament by crafting a programme that 
would be popular with the rural masses across 
the country. Thus, the politics of patronage 
played a key role in the establishment of the 
FISP.176
The core of FISP in Malawi has been the effort 
to persuade approximately 50% of farmers 
in the country to use fertilisers and improved 
seeds via a voucher system. FISP provides maize 
farmers with vouchers for one 50kg bag of 
basal NPK fertiliser, one 50kg bag of urea top 
dressing, and improved maize seed. Originally 
these seeds were open-pollinated varieties 
(OPVs) but in recent years the emphasis has 
shifted to hybrid maize seed. More recently, 
legume seeds have also been provided.
Although FISP relies on the private sector for 
fertiliser imports, the procurement, distribution 
and retail aspects of the programme are 
dominated by two government parastatals, 
the Agricultural Development & Marketing 
Corporation (ADMARC) and the Smallholder 
Farmer Fertiliser Revolving Fund (SFFRM). 
The private sector was involved in retail, 
procurement and distribution only in the years 
2006–2007 and 2008–2009.
The fiscal costs of FISP have been considerable, 
accounting for 8% of the entire national 
budget in 2006–2007 and 2007—2008. 
With the spike in global fertiliser prices this 
figure rose to an enormous 16.2%. Even when 
fertiliser prices tailed off, fertilisers were still 
contributing 75% of programme costs over the 
three seasons from 2009 to 2012. In 2012–2013 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security 
(MoAFS) allocated 54.5% of its budget to FISP.
With such an abundance of public resources 
being channelled through FISP, rent seeking 
and corruption have inevitably followed. A 
World Bank report commissioned early in the 
life of FISP estimated that irregularities in 
procurement and transport, which involved 
favours for certain politically connected 
http://www.owen.org/blog/4309
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contractors, increased overall programme costs 
by up to 50%.
While FISP was designed specifically to target 
the poorest and most vulnerable using a 
system of coupons rather than cash, evidence 
has emerged of a parallel informal voucher 
system to which access is determined by 
political connections. Former president 
Mutharika’s home district received significantly 
more coupons than known opposition districts, 
a trend that was particularly pronounced in the 
run up to the 2009 elections.177
FISP has also not been immune to the curse 
of leakage (as reported above). For example, 
in 2006–2007 and 2008–2009 small-scale 
farmers received only 63% and 68% of recorded 
coupon deliveries, which suggests high levels of 
diversion. Although this figure rose to 85% by 
2010–2011, the fact remains that fully 15% of all 
fertilisers were still not reaching their intended 
targets.
Late deliveries to depots have also hampered 
the outcomes of the programme. Though this 
situation has improved  since the early years of 
FISP, in the period 2010–2011 only 85% of stocks 
had been delivered by the end of November—
ideally all supplies should be available by mid 
November.
Despite Female-Headed Households (FH 
Households) being specifically targeted, due 
to their status as a vulnerable group, their 
experience has been mixed. Data for the 
2006–2007 and 2010–2011 seasons shows that 
Male-Headed Households (MH Households) 
received a higher proportion of coupons, while 
data for the 2008–2009 season shows that FH 
Households received more coupons. However, 
deeper analysis of the period 2008–2009 
found that while an increased number of 
FH Households had received coupons, MH 
Households had received a greater number of 
coupons. A study from central Malawi found 
that 11% of FH Households had received the 
full package of two bags of fertiliser, compared 
with 29% of MH Households. Analysis of access 
to fertilisers and decision-making within the 
household led Doward and Chirwa to conclude 
that women have some say in the use of 
fertiliser. This is attributed to the fact that most 
subsidised fertiliser is meant for the cultivation 
of maize for subsistence needs, for which 
women are seen as providers at the household 
level.
What of the results of FISP? Does it justify 
the ‘miracle’ tag, or the enormous cost? In 
2004–2005, which was the growing season 
before FISP was implemented, the national 
maize harvest in Malawi was 1.2 million MT. 
In subsequent years the total maize harvests 
have ranged from 2.6 million to 3.8 million 
MT, suggesting a positive impact of fertilisers. 
However, as has been argued elsewhere, it 
has proven difficult to separate the impacts 
of FISP from other variables, such as weather 
conditions. Further, the high production figures 
reported are not consistent with very high 
domestic food prices from early 2008 through 
to 2009. Doubts have been raised about the 
methodology used by the MoAFS to obtain 
these figures, suggesting there may have been 
some risk of an upward bias in reporting, for 
political gain.
These doubts appeared to be justified, at least 
during the early period of FISP. Results of the 
2006–2007 agricultural census, conducted by 
the National Office of Statistics and funded 
by the Norwegian Agency for Development 
Co-Operation (NORAD), were published in 2010. 
The results showed a national crop estimate of 
2.1 million MT, which is 1.3 million MT less than 
the figure provided by the MoAFS.178 It comes 
as no surprise that these results were not 
accepted by the MoAFS.
Field surveys with FISP beneficiaries indicate 
that, in the short-term, FISP has impacted 
positively on maize yields, crop and household 
income, and food consumption. Results have 
been mixed regarding (1) the ownership of 
physical assets (i.e. the ability of beneficiaries 
to increase material resources), and (2) 
responses in terms of ‘subjective well-being’. 
The majority of cases where households 
reported success with the subsidy programme 
were from those who already had been in a 
position to afford commercial fertilisers before 
the subsidies were introduced. Looking at the 
wider-economy effects of FISP, Chirwa and 
Dorward (2013) found “mixed and puzzling 
results” and commented that changes which 
had occurred were “not as strong as one would 
expect and hope from a programme as large as 
the Malawi FISP”.
The political economy of Africa’s burgeoning chemical fertiliser rush    41
Conclusion 
While Africa accounts for less than 1.6% of 
global fertiliser consumption, huge natural 
gas deposits, a key ingredient in fertiliser 
production, have been found across the 
continent. Numerous multinational mining 
houses are also prospecting for other mineral 
reserves vital to fertiliser production. As a 
result, a spate of new fertiliser plants are 
being planned across the continent. Fertilisers 
are a fundamental ingredient of the Green 
Revolution model of agriculture, which is 
being pushed onto Africa. This was recognised 
explicitly by the Abuja Declaration on 
Fertilisers, endorsed by African leaders at the 
African Fertiliser Summit in June 2006 in Abuja, 
Nigeria. The Declaration called for a blanket 
increase of fertiliser application across the 
continent, from 8kg per ha to 50kg per ha, by 
2015.
The Green Revolution push involves a 
bewildering array of actors from both the 
public and private sectors. The Alliance for 
a Green Revolution in Africa, financially 
supported by the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation is, arguably, the most prominent. 
The IFDC, whose donors include all the major 
fertiliser industry bodies, and USAID, are also 
intimately involved in promoting fertiliser use 
on the continent.
More recently, Grow Africa and the G8 New 
Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition have 
lent their considerable backing to the fertiliser 
drive in Africa. This is not surprising as Yara, one 
of the world’s largest fertiliser companies, was 
instrumental in the formulation of the new 
partnership, which is led by WEF, the AU and 
NEPAD.
In recent years a major point of access 
to fertilisers for small-scale farmers has 
been through the ISPs. In 2011 ten African 
governments spent US$1 billion on these 
programmes but results have been mixed, with 
evidence of both the diversion of fertilisers 
into commercial markets and elite capture. It is 
also unclear whether subsidies will benefit the 
poorest and most needy individuals in society, 
or those from a better-resourced stratum. 
Crucially, the imposition of fertiliser subsidies 
has diverted precious resources away from 
research into crop and soil science which could 
help to promote the use of less expensive, 
locally available sources of soil nutrients.
No one would deny that small-scale farmers 
in Africa should receive the support they need 
to improve their lot, but the mainstream 
discourse thus far has concentrated almost 
exclusively on a Green Revolution model 
focused on the commercialisation of a select 
layer of rural society. Very little is said about 
the fate of the majority of small-scale farmers 
who will not be able to participate. Efforts 
to raise fertiliser consumption across the 
continent, though wrapped in the language 
of integrated soil fertility management, are 
being driven by a global fertiliser industry in 
which economies of scale dwarf many national 
agricultural budgets. Significant investments 
in infrastructure will also be required to 
underpin this. Again, it is not clear how these 
investments will be funded, or who will benefit 
from them in the long run. It is in this context 
that the fertiliser push in Africa must be 
understood, and indeed needs further research 
and analysis.
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Annexure 1. Soil forming 
factors and processes179
Soils comprise varying proportions of minerals, 
water, air and organic matter. Broadly speaking, 
minerals can account for up to 95% of soil; water 
and air both from 15%–35%; and organic matter 
up to 5%—in arid regions the amount of organic 
matter and water will be much less. How water, 
air and organic matter move within the soil is 
heavily influenced by the size and arrangement 
of its mineral particles, of which there are three 
main classes: clay (<0.002mm in diameter), silt 
(0.02–0.64mm) and sand (0.063–2.0 mm). A 
soil sample is classified based upon the relative 
proportions of the three main particle types. For 
example, a soil with 40% sand, 40% silt and 20% 
clay is called a ‘loam’.
The properties of a soil also vary with depth, in 
most cases forming a series of horizontal layers 
(known as horizons) which can be distinguished 
by colour, texture, structure, organic matter and 
the presence of carbonates. Generally, soils can 
exhibit three to four different horizons (though 
this can vary considerably), with horizons in older 
soils generally being more discernible than those 
in younger soils (such as those on river sediments, 
sand dunes or volcanic ash).
The uppermost horizon is referred to as the 
organic or ‘O’ horizon, where organic matter 
decays on the surface. Beneath the O horizon lies 
the  A horizon, commonly known as the topsoil. 
Topsoil has been called the engine room of the 
soil, as it is home to the majority of organic 
material in the soil and is where most of the 
biological and chemical activities within it occur. 
If the topsoil is removed, it takes most of the soil’s 
ecological potential with it and, though it can 
regenerate over time, it could take hundreds of 
years for its full original potential to be restored. 
Below the topsoil is the mineral subsoil (the‘B 
horizon) which contains much less organic 
material than the topsoil above, though plant 
roots and soil animals still source water, air and 
nutrients stored within it. The C and R horizons 
are found below the B horizon. The C horizon 
is the result of weathered material from the 
underlying bedrock of the‘R horizon.
Soil forming factors 
How the soil forms is subject to the interactions 
of numerous variables, the most important 
of which are: parent material, topography 
or position in the landscape, climate, living 
organisms (especially vegetation), human 
activities and time.
Parent material refers to unconsolidated deposits 
or loose sediments that have been transported by 
ice, water, wind or gravity, or weathered materials 
directly overlying the bedrock from which they 
originate. The mineralogy of the parent material 
is mirrored in the soil; for example, lime-rich 
soils are generally derived from calcareous rocks, 
such as limestone or chalk. Parent material 
is constantly being acted upon by physical 
reactions—in which the chemical composition of 
the parent material is unchanged—or chemical 
reactions.
Topography has an important influence on local 
climate, vegetation and water movement. For 
example, mountains can affect the amount and 
intensity of precipitation and vegetation growth, 
while the angle of their slopes controls water 
drainage and the movement of other material. 
Generally, soils at the top of slopes are more 
freely draining than those at the bottom of a 
slope or in a valley bottom.
Climatic factors that impact upon soil 
formation include precipitation, average annual 
temperature, the annual range in temperature, 
the length of the growing period,180 rainfall, 
as well as soil temperature and soil moisture 
regimes.
Living organisms add organic matter to the 
soil through the breakdown of litter and 
decomposition of roots. Micro-organisms, such as 
fungi and bacteria, facilitate chemical exchanges 
between roots and the soil to produce nutrients. 
Animals and plants both allow for moisture and 
gases to seep deeper into the soil, via burrows 
and root channels.
Time—the physical, biological and chemical 
processes which result in soil formulation can 
operate over hundreds or even thousands of 
years, although major changes can occur over 
much shorter time scales (from 100–1,000 years) 
via annual fluctuations in weather patterns or 
changes in land use. The rate of soil formulation 
can vary tremendously; on volcanic ash in the 
humid tropics up to 5cm of soil can be created 
within a century, while 1cm can take up to 5,000 
years to form on hard bedrock in temperate 
climates. Chemical weathering is much stronger 
if temperatures and humidity are high, as in the 
humid tropics.
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Soil forming processes 
Weathering—there are two principle types of 
weathering: physical and chemical. The freezing 
and expansion of water within the crevices of 
rocks is a typical example of physical weathering, 
which causes the breakdown of rocks without 
changing their physical composition. In chemical 
weathering a key factor is the reaction between 
water and elements within the parent material. 
De-calcification, which occurs on parent material 
rich in calcium carbonate (such as chalk and 
limestone) is a common form of chemical 
weathering. Rain (which is slightly acidic in 
unpolluted environments) combines with 
carbon dioxide or an organic acid to form a weak 
carbonic acid. This carbonic acid then reacts with 
calcium carbonate to form calcium bicarbonate, 
which is then removed.
Calcium carbonate plays an important role in the 
soil, keeping its pH level above 7. Consequently, 
soils turn acidic when calcium carbonate is 
removed thus reducing the soil’s agronomic 
potential. Chemical weathering is much stronger 
where temperatures and humidity are both high, 
such as the humid tropics. In humid climates, 
during periods when rainfall exceeds the rate 
of evaporation, excess rainfall fills up spaces 
in the soil and percolates down to accumulate 
as groundwater. This can result in the leaching 
or flushing of nutrients from the topsoil into 
deeper parts of the soil, and the movement of 
clay particles or even the destruction181 of clay 
particles, all of which have a generally negative 
impact (as far as crop cultivation is concerned) 
on the soil. Soil leaching is also a characteristic 
of wet tropical climates, where average 
temperatures hover around 26C and annual 
rainfall is over 2,000mm.
In dry tropical and sub-tropical climates, where 
precipitation is lower than evapotranspiration (i.e. 
the sum of evaporation and plant transpiration 
from the Earth’s land and ocean surface to the 
atmosphere), and high temperatures cause 
groundwater to rise to the surface, substantial 
accumulations of calcium carbonate (lime), 
gypsum and silica can ensue. These conditions 
can also lead to the incidence of saline soils 
(where salt concentration is at or over 2,500 parts 
per million).
Water can influence soil formation in other ways. 
In water-logged topsoils that also contain organic 
matter, the metabolic activity of micro-organisms 
will create a deficit of oxygen, causing ferric 
iron to convert into more soluble ferrous iron. 
In areas with distinct dry and wet seasons that 
contain large quantities of swelling clay minerals 
(smectites) soils are characterised by the presence 
of deep cracks in dry periods, into which granular 
material on the surface will fall. When rains come 
and the cracks close, internal pressures cause the 
subsoil to rise and mix with the topsoil. Such soils 
(known as vertisols) are very hard when dry and 
very sticky when wet, making cultivation very 
difficult. The mixing processes can even snap the 
roots of large plants and trees.
Soil forming processes are significantly influenced 
by the accumulation and decay of organic 
matter (predominantly plants), which is used 
by a variety of micro-organisms for energy and 
other needs. In the process, water, carbon dioxide 
and various other organic compounds (such as 
sugars, starches and proteins) are converted 
into inorganic compounds such as ammonium, 
phosphate and sulphate, compounds vital to 
plant growth. The annual return of organic 
matter to the soil varies with climate, vegetation 
and land use. In the tropical forests of West Africa 
up to 15 tons of organic matter are returned per 
ha, compared with roughly 8 tons for temperate 
grasslands and 2 tons for agricultural soils.
Humus, a dark brown or black material 
rich in mineral nutrients, is created by the 
decomposition of organic matter and essentially 
consists of carbon, oxygen, hydrogen and 
nitrogen. By weight, organic carbon accounts 
for 40–60% of humus. Organic matter that 
accumulates in water-logged conditions, such as 
those found in bogs or swamps, produces a type 
of soil known as peat. Finally, living organisms, 
such as burrowing mammals, beetles and 
earthworms in temperate zones, and termites 
and ants in the tropics, also play an important 
role in soil formation.
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Annexure 2. The Abuja 
Declaration on Fertilisers 
1. Given the strategic importance of fertiliser 
in achieving the African Green Revolution to 
end hunger, the African Union Member States 
resolve to increase the level of use of fertiliser 
from the current average of 8 kilograms per 
hectare to an average of at least 50 kilograms 
per hectare by 2015.
2. By mid-2007, the African Union Member 
States and the Regional Economic 
Communities should take appropriate 
measures to reduce the cost of fertiliser 
procurement at national and regional levels 
especially through the harmonisation of 
policies and regulations to ensure duty- and 
tax-free movement across regions, and the 
development of capacity for quality control. As 
an immediate measure, we recommend the 
elimination of taxes and tariffs on fertiliser 
and on fertiliser raw materials.
3. By mid-2007, the African Governments must 
take concrete measures to improve farmers’ 
access to fertilisers, by developing and scaling 
up input dealers’ and community-based 
networks across rural areas. The Private 
Sector and Development Partners are hereby 
requested to support such actions.
4. By 2007, the African Union Member States 
must take concrete measures to specially 
address the fertiliser needs of farmers, 
especially women, and to develop and 
strengthen the capacity of youth, farmers’ 
associations, civil society organisations, and 
the private sector.
5. With immediate effect, the African Union 
Member States must improve farmers’ access 
to fertiliser, by granting, with the support 
of Africa’s Development Partners, targeted 
subsidies in favour of the fertiliser sector, with 
special attention to poor farmers.
6. The African Union Member States should take 
immediate steps to accelerate investment 
in infrastructure, particularly transport, 
fiscal incentives, strengthening farmers’ 
organisations, and other measures to improve 
output market incentives.
7. The African Union Member States should 
establish national financing facilities for input 
suppliers to accelerate access to credit at the 
local and national level, with specific attention 
to women.
8. The African Union Member States hereby 
request the establishment of Regional 
Fertiliser Procurement and Distribution 
Facilities with the support of the African 
Development Bank, the Economic 
Commission for Africa, the Regional Economic 
Communities and the Regional Development 
Banks, through strategic public-private 
partnerships by the end of 2007.
9. Given the extensive fertiliser raw material 
resources in Africa and the fact that they are 
under-utilised in many parts of the continent, 
the African Union Member States undertake 
to promote national/regional fertiliser 
production and intra-regional fertiliser 
trade to capture a bigger market and take 
advantage of economies of scale through 
appropriate measures such as tax incentives 
and infrastructure development. This should 
be supported by the African Development 
Bank, the Economic Commission for Africa, the 
Regional Development Banks, the Regional 
Economic Communities, other Development 
Partners, and the Private Sector.
10. The African Union Member States should take 
specific action to improve farmer access to 
quality seeds, irrigation facilities, extension 
services, market information, and soil nutrient 
testing and mapping to facilitate effective 
and efficient use of inorganic and organic 
fertilisers, while paying attention to the 
environment.
11. The African Development Bank, with the 
support of the Economic Commission for 
Africa and the African Union Commission, is 
called to establish, by 2007, an Africa Fertiliser 
Development Financing Mechanism that 
will meet the financing requirements of the 
various actions agreed upon by the Summit. 
We, the African Union Member States, 
undertake to support the establishment of 
this facility and will pledge resources for its 
immediate operation.
12. The African Union Member States request 
the African Union Commission and the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development to set 
up a mechanism to monitor and evaluate 
the implementation of this resolution. This 
should be done in collaboration with the 
Economic Commission for Africa and the 
African Development Bank. The African Union 
Commission should give progress reports 
to the African Heads of State at every sixth-
monthly African Union Summit, starting in 
January 2007.
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